# South China Sea

## Yes Conflict

### Hardliners

#### SCS conflict inevitable in the status quo – growing dominance of hardliners, increased rivalry, and lack of trust

Kuo 5-26 – Lily Kuo, Reporter for Quartz, Previously reporter for Reuters, May 26th 2015(“China Warns of “Inevitable” War with US over South China Sea” Quartz, Available online at <http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/05/china-warns-inevitable-war-us-over-south-china-sea/113680/>, Accessed online 6/28/16, AJ)

After Chinese state media warned that war with the United States may be “inevitable,” Beijing has published a policy paper detailing how the military will shift its focus from land and coastlines to the open seas. China’s State Council released a white paper today that criticizes “external countries…busy meddling in South China Sea affairs” and sets out an “active defense” military strategy for the country.

The paper comes a day after an editorial (link in Chinese) in the state-run Chinese tabloid Global Times said conflict between China and the US will be unavoidable if the Washington doesn’t lay off Beijing for building islands and military facilities in disputed parts of the South China Sea.

“We do not want a military conflict with the United States, but if it were to come we have to accept it,” the paper said. (Editorials in state-run papers are not official representations of Beijing’s position, but often reflect government sentiment.)

The US has been calling on China to halt the construction of entire islands with ports, army barracks and at least one air strip near the Spratly Islands. The area—one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes and home to fertile fishing grounds as well as possibly oil and gas—is the focus of overlapping claims by China, the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Brunei.

According to the white paper, the People’s Liberation Army Navy will expand its defense perimeter to include “open seas protection.” The air force will also expand its focus to include offensive as well as defensive military capabilities. “We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked,” the paper said.

Chinese authorities denied the white paper had anything to do with tension over US surveillance of China’s building in the Spratlys. On Monday, China’s foreign ministry said that it had filed a complaint with the US for flying a spy plane near Chinese island construction sites last week.

International security experts have long said that armed conflict between the two countries is unlikely given their economic reliance on each other. Increasingly scholars and analysts say that war may not be “as improbable as many experts suggest” because of growing dominance of hardliners in the Chinese government, increased rivalry, or general lack of trust between the countries.

The US and other states are preparing for any potential confrontation. Southeast Asian countries are building up their navies and coastguards—defense spending in the region is expected to reach $52 billion by 2020, up from a projected $42 billion this year, IHS Janes Defence has said.

Last week, US vice president Joe Biden told graduates at the Naval Academy in Annapolis that 60% of the United States Naval force will be stationed in the Asia Pacific by 2020, in order to stand up for freedom of navigation and peaceful, equitable resolution to territorial disputes. “Today, these principles are being tested by Chinese activities in the South China Sea…We are going to look to you to uphold these principles wherever they are challenged,” he said.

### Tipping Point

#### The tipping point for SCS conflict is now – nationalistic and resource-based tensions

Mollman 5-12 – Steve Mollman, Asia Correspondent for Quartz News Journal, May 12th 2016(“Beijing is Setting the State for War in the South China Sea,” Quartz, Available online at <http://qz.com/680123/beijing-is-setting-the-stage-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/>, Accessed on 6/28/16, AJ)

All any nation needs to go to war is a good provocation, and China is no exception. With its sweeping territorial claims, island-building, militarization, patriotic fervor, and prickly rhetoric, Beijing is setting itself up to be repeatedly provoked in the South China Sea—it might even be counting on it.

Consider the nation’s manmade, militarized island at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratly archipelago. Though it didn’t even exist a few years ago, and for decades ships from other nations could routinely sail by it without disturbance, now Beijing feels provoked if anyone goes near it—and sends out warnings or makes aggressive gestures in response.

This week the USS William P. Lawrence, a guided missile destroyer from the US Navy, conducted a “freedom of navigation” operation near the island. It deliberately sailed within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef. If the US recognized the reef as China’s territory to begin with—which it does not— that would be considered entering China’s territory.

The problem is China has claimed, outrageously, that nearly the entire sea is its own territory. Considering the fact that some $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes through the strategic waterway every year, that’s a problem not just for the US, but any number of countries participating in the global economy. The US Navy’s operation was a reminder to China that the sea is open waters, despite any impromptu islands that might have been constructed of late.

China bases its sea claim on a “nine-dash line” that it drew on a map after World War 2. Never mind that the line conflicts with international norms and overlapping claims by nearby nations, including the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia, nations whose coasts are much closer to the disputed sea than China’s.

Many observers feel it’s ridiculous to base real-world claims on such a map. Internet satire has ensued.

The problem is that China is actually serious, however surreal the claim may seem

From a military strategy point of view, at least, it’s easy to see why.

The strategic waterway is “one of the most important oil and natural gas transport choke points in the world,” geopolitical analyst Tim Daiss wrote this week in Forbes. Passing through it each year, he noted, is almost 60% of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, and 80% of China’s crude oil imports

Were a conflict involving these or other nations to break out, control of the sea could give Beijing a distinct advantage in securing—or blocking—the energy needed to power a war machine. The most critical resource that Japan lacked in World War 2 was oil—a key history lesson surely not lost on China’s military strategists. (The sea is full of its own vast untapped reserves of oil and natural gas, too.)

To acquire the sea’s strategic advantage, though, China first needs to establish control over the waterway. That needs to be done step by step. The process might go something like this

Make the sea claim.

Create outposts in the sea, and work toward turning them into military bases. At this stage, you might want to deny the military bit.

Express outrage if anyone goes near those outposts. Over time, establish a pattern of being repeatedly provoked, despite your patient warnings. Your outposts aren’t quite military bases yet anyway, so this is a good use of your time in the meantime.

As your outposts get closer to becoming real military bases, feel free to grow more strident in your responses to the “provocations.”

Once your military infrastructure is fully up to speed, you’re ready for war—you even have a track record of provocations to point to for justification! Of course you don’t have to start a conflict, but it’s nice to know you can at any time—and feel justified about it.

China isn’t just relying on its military. The country has a massive fishing fleet, and by far the world’s largest fish industry. For years Beijing has been paying fishing boats to operate near its disputed outposts in the sea, even if they don’t catch much in the area. It certainly helps appearances.

The fishing fleet needs to expand outward because through over-fishing it has nearly depleted the fishing stock near China’s own shores. So it increasingly needs to fish in the exclusive economic zones of other nations, as it is doing. By establishing outposts and more control over the sea, China’s military can better support the fleet’s forays into distant or contested waters.

Those fishing forays often involve confrontations with foreign coastguards or navies. (Hey, more potential provocations!) With other nations responding by beefing up their maritime forces and monitoring technologies—networked nano-satellites, in the case of Indonesia—more such confrontations can be expected in the future.

Beijing has also whipped up patriotic feelings in the Chinese population about the sea being the nation’s birthright. A warship recently took a song-and-dance troupe on a tour of various disputed outposts in the sea. It started at Fiery Cross Reef, where celebrity singer Song Zuying gave a stirring rendition of a song called “Ode to the South Sea Defenders.”

State media coverage of the event included an interview with a navy officer from the audience telling CCTV after the performance, “We’ll definitely not lose at our hands an inch of the territories our ancestors left us.”

The TV coverage offered glimpses into just how impressively far along the island construction has come in a short time. The island even has runways suitable for fighter jets. This suggests China is well into Step 4 above. And indeed, it’s grown increasingly stern in its responses to “provocations.”

When a US Navy warship passed by the Spratlys last October, China simply warned it against acting irresponsibly. But this week when another warship did the same thing, it sent fighter jets scrambling and shadowed the US ship with its own warships—thanks in part to the convenient military base nearby.

Even talking about China’s activities in the sea—in diplomatic settings—now draws ire from Beijing. In April it warned G7 leaders meeting in Japan to not discuss the matter at all, and then said it was “strongly dissatisfied” after they did anyway.

Last week, one Chinese diplomat warned that criticism of China’s actions in the sea would rebound like a coiled spring. If comments are “aimed at putting pressure on China or blackening its name, then you can view it like a spring, which has an applied force and a counterforce. The more the pressure, the greater the reaction,” said Ouyang Yujing, director-general of the foreign ministry’s department of boundary and ocean affairs.

In other words, Beijing is pressing its outrageous claims in the South China, and will take any opposition as a reason to press them even harder

### Mil Modernization

#### Military modernization and A2/AD capabilities massively increase the risk of conflict

Torsvoll 15 – Eirik Torsvoll, research assistant at PluriCourts, an Oslo-based research center for the study of the legitimate roles of the judiciary in the global order, Winter 2015(“Deterring Conflict with China: A Comparison of the Air-Sea Battle Concept, Offshore Control, and Deterrence by Denial,” The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, VOL. 39:1 WINTER 2015, Accessed 6/28/16, AJ)

Anti-access and area-denial are fairly recent concepts, referring to attempts to deny an adversary access to, as well as the ability to maneuver near and within, a military theater of operation.' However, these are well established goals in combat, and A2/AD measures in this sense are nothing new.1° What is new are the recent advances in both technology and proliferation that have made A2/AD capabilities much more potent. Developments in missile technology have been particularly important in this regard. They have radically changed the balance between offense and defense in favor of the latter, and will arguably be at the forefront of almost all intricate regional problems facing Washington and Beijing."

China has been emboldened by the development of anti-access forces at an unprecedented rate. Its current A2/ AD capabilities comprise a formidable fusion of a "new generation of cruise, ballistic, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles with improved range, accuracy, and lethality."12 This includes the muchtouted anti-ship ballistic missile, nicknamed the "carrier-killer," which China has been integrating into the People's Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine."3 China is coupling these weapons with modernized submarines, fighter jets, and sea mining capabilities. The missiles will be able to accurately attack U.S. forces and forward bases at ranges exceeding 1,000 nautical miles."4 In addition, new developments in anti-satellite and cyber capabilities create other opportunities to hinder U.S. power projection abilities.

In a hypothetical conflict scenario, Chinese capabilities, in combination with the maritime geography of the region (where U.S. power projection is heavily reliant on island bases and bases on allied soil), would create a difficult environment for U.S. forces. China's A2/AD capacity would, at the very outset, create doubt in the ability of the United States to intervene. Furthermore, their capabilities could constrain the scope of an intervention, or push the United States to deploy at more distant locations."5 Such deployment problems would be further exacerbated by the "tyranny of distance," as U.S. forces would have to operate far from home, encountering a range of logistical challenges, while the theater of operations would take place in China's backyard.16

The rapid expansion of Chinas military can thus be seen as a calculated approach to counter the superior strength of the U.S. military, playing on the American weakness of distance, while building on its own technological strengths. The result could be defeat for U.S. forces in the region by preventing them from fulfilling their military goals, while allowing the PRC to successfully expand its influence in the island chain. Alternatively, inaction, or a lack of response on the part of the United States, might inaccurately convince leaders in Beijing that they would be facing an easy or no-war scenario, which, if confronted by a determined Washington, could in fact involve huge losses in blood and treasure. 7

### Economic

#### SCS escalates – too important economically for either country to give up

Mody 6-5 – Seema Mody, Journalist for CNBC, June 5th 2016(“Why Beijing Won’t Back Down in the South China Sea,” The Fiscal Times, Available online <http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/2016/06/05/Why-Beijing-Won-t-Back-Down-South-China-Sea>, Accessed online 6/29, AJ)

Tensions between the United States and China continue to escalate in the South China Sea, with freedom of navigation in one of the world's most critical maritime passages potentially at stake.

With no resolution in sight, both sides are ramping up their military capabilities in the massive body of water, potentially including nuclear weaponry and anti-ballistic missiles.

"This has become a military contest between China and the U.S.," said Jennifer Harris, former member of the policy planning staff at the U.S. Department of State and a foreign relations expert.

The so-called "nine-dash line" that China has drawn over most of the South China Sea — a gargantuan territorial claim that stretches about 1,200 miles from its shores — would give Beijing control over a zone that's estimated to handle about half of global merchant shipping, a third of the planet's oil shipping, two-thirds of global liquid natural gas shipments, and more than a 10th of Earth's fish catch. Most nations in the region are dependent on the free flow of goods through the body of water. Japan and South Korea, for example, receive the vast majority of their Persian Gulf oil through the South China Sea.

### A2 Diplomacy

#### International Diplomacy fails on the South China Sea – wavering support, feasibility, and US engagement prove

Parameswaran 15(Prashant Parameswaran, Journalist for the Diplomat, 4-10-15, “A New Way to Resolve Disputes in the South China Sea?,” The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/one-new-way-to-resolve-the-south-china-sea-disputes/)

While it is not uncommon to hear versions of such an idea floated as potential options publicly and privately, it is certainly not one of the more orthodox approaches usually featured in the headlines. It would also seem at first glance to make some sense, if achieving some clarity as soon as possible is the overriding objective. But the proposal would also likely face several formidable challenges if actually attempted. First, even leaving China aside — given its allergic reaction to ‘internationalizing’ the issue — it is unclear how much support there would be among the remaining South China Sea claimants for such a public way to resolve differing claims. A few may not even wish to attend the conference, as they may prefer more low-profile or quieter ways of handling disputes. Much of this will also depend on form rather than substance. Heavy involvement by outside actors including the United States might appeal to bolder claimants like the Philippines or Vietnam but be less appealing to Malaysia, for example — particularly if it is read as external interference by China and places these states in a rather awkward position between Washington and Beijing. And let’s not even mention the diplomatic minefield of inviting both Taiwan and mainland China to participate in an international dialogue on sovereignty issues.

Second, assuming the conference is convened and most of the claimants do attend, resolving claims between parties is likely to be notoriously difficult in practice. For all the attention paid to China’s nine-dash line and its challenge to other claimants, several Southeast Asian states have unresolved disputes amongst themselves as well. Blair suggested that some of these issues might be more negotiable than other, fiercer disputes because they do not involve lost homelands, large populations, or even significant economic resources (depending on how one estimates potential hydrocarbon resources). Instead, the South China Sea disputes are largely about national pride and politics. To be fair, incremental efforts have been made to at least resolve some of these disputes over the years, including Malaysia’s quiet resolution with Brunei in 2009. But as the recent controversy between Malaysia and the Philippines over issues related to the South China Sea and Sabah during the past few weeks has illustrated, some of these disagreements are tough nuts to crack.

Third and lastly, even if the conference did leave with some resolution of the disputes between claimants, it is unclear how exactly these claimants, along with other outside actors, would implement this new reality on the ground, as Blair proposed, and whether they have both the capabilities and the willingness to do so. This is particularly the case if China is not part of how that reality is shaped; Beijing has so far aggressively demonstrated that it is serious about altering the status quo in its favor – including through coercion if necessary. Would the Philippines or Malaysia, or even ASEAN countries collectively, be expected to challenge Beijing over areas that lie within the nine-dash line following the conference, and, if so, how much would they be willing to risk? I have noted more specifically some of the challenges inherent in even slightly more forward-leaning individual and regional approaches in the maritime realm and the South China Sea, let alone overt challenges to China there (see, for instance, here, here and here).

As for outside actors, taking the example of the United States, how much would Washington be willing to commit to operationalize this new reality given its nuanced policy of not taking a position on the disputes themselves but being concerned about how they are resolved and their broader consequences for the region? Blair, for his part, believes that U.S. policy in the South China Sea thus far has been “tentative and quite weak” and does not adequately recognize key American interests. But that still leaves the more difficult question of how far America is willing to go – including committing assets and risking a downturn in the U.S.-China relationship – to see a proper resolution to conflicting claims in the South China Sea.

#### China and ASEAN say no.

Kuok 15 – Lynn Kuok, fellow at Brookings Institution’s Center for East Asia Policy Studies, a visiting fellow at the Harvard Law School, and a senior visiting fellow at the Centre for International Law, May 2015(“Tides of Change: Taiwan’s evolving position in the South China Sea,” Brookings, Available online at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2015/05/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok/taiwan-south-china-sea-kuok-paper.pdf, Accessed on 6/22/16, AJ)

Taiwan’s recent moves and approach notwithstanding, very little has been made of the role Taipei can play in contributing to better management of the dispute and overall stability in the South China Sea. At the root of this is China’s “one-China” principle, namely, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”4

The principle has cast a long shadow over Taiwan and has resulted in Taiwan’s exclusion from regional negotiations and forums relating to the South China Sea, such as negotiations on a code of conduct, as well as cooperative activities with claimants. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member states are worried about being seen to fall foul of China’s one-China principle. Moreover, they see little benefit in including Taiwan in the fray. To them, Taiwan’s claims are virtually indistinguishable from China’s and there are lingering concerns about cross-strait co-operation to defend claims in the South China Sea, despite clear statements from Taipei that this is out of the question.

China is cautious about Taiwan’s involvement in the South China Sea as it regards this as a slippery slope toward recognition of ROC sovereignty. Beijing also appears to have linked flexibility on Taiwan’s regional and international participation to Taipei demonstrating a greater willingness to discuss the island’s political relationship with the mainland. Till then, China’s default position is to stand firm against it. This, however, is counterproductive insofar as it is resented by Taiwan and undermines cross-strait relations.

### Philippines v. China ruling ignored

#### China will ignore the Philippines challenge.

Benner 6-5-16(Tom Benner, Journalist for Al Jazeera, 6-5-16, “Tensions escalate over South China Sea Claim, ” Al Jazeera, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/tensions-escalate-south-china-sea-claims-160605065515637.html)

At the weekend-long Shangri-La Dialogue , Chinese military officials vowed to ignore a legal ruling expected in the next few weeks by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on a Philippines' challenge to China's growing assertiveness in the key sea route between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

"We do not make trouble, but we have no fear of trouble," said Admiral Sun Jianguo, deputy chief of staff of the People's Liberation Army, who led the Chinese delegation at the summit.

The Hague court is expected to rule on the legality of the so-called "nine-dash line", China's cartographic marker that it uses to claim territorial rights over most of the resource-rich sea. China's claimed sovereignty stretches hundreds of kilometres to the south and east of its most southerly province of Hainan, covering hundreds of disputed islands and reefs.

The nine-dash line, first shown on a 1947 Chinese map, carves out an area that runs deep into the maritime heart of Southeast Asia, and overlaps claims from Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan.

China has boycotted The Hague tribunal's proceedings and instead wants bilateral talks with rival claimants, all of which lack China's economic and military prowess.

#### China rejects the UN court ruling

Bitzinger 6-21 – Richard Bitzinger, Senior Fellow and Coordinator of the Military Transformations Program at the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Junes 21st 2016(“China’s Militarization of the South China Sea: Building a strategic strait.” Asia Times, Available online at <http://atimes.com/2016/06/chinas-militarization-of-the-south-china-sea-building-a-strategic-strait/>, Accessed 6/24/16, AJ)

The UN arbitration court will soon rule on the case, brought by the Philippines against China, over who owns the Scarborough Shoal, located in the South China Sea (SCS). It is all but certain that China will reject the ruling, no matter what it says, because Beijing has already decided that the SCS is a Chinese lake, subject to its “indisputable sovereignty.” However, the issue of Chinese hegemony in the SCS is less and less about economics – oil and gas reserves, or fishing rights – and increasingly about the militarization of this body of water. The South China Sea is becoming, quite simply, a key defensive zone for China.

### Goes Nuclear

#### Conflict goes nuclear – conventional and nuclear forces are linked and indistinguishable.

Talmadge 16 – Caitlin Talmadge, Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Elliot School of International Relations at George Washington University, February 2016(“Preventing Nuclear Escalation in U.S.-China Conflict”, Institute for Security and Conflict Studies, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/china_policy_brief_talmadge_0.pdf>, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

Conventional war between the United States and China remains a low-probability event. But if such a war were to break out, the risk of nuclear escalation—that is, actual detonation of nuclear weapons— likely would be higher than many observers realize. Some aspects of a likely U.S. campaign in a conventional war against China could look to China like an attempt at conventional counterforce, pressuring China to escalate to nuclear use while it still could.

This escalation scenario is distinct from other possible pathways to nuclear use. For example, in the Cold War the classic scenario for escalation was pre-emption, the notion that one side might try to use its nuclear weapons to pre-emptively destroy the arsenal of the other. Other scenarios for nuclear escalation include mistaken launch based on faulty warning information, and unauthorized launch by a commander who is physically able to use nuclear weapons but does not have political permission to do so. In addition, some states develop doctrines that deliberately threaten to escalate to the first use of nuclear weapons in the event of rapid conventional losses.

Nuclear escalation in response to an opponent’s perceived attempt at conventional counterforce constitutes an alternative pathway to nuclear escalation. It can arise when one side’s conventional military campaign infringes or appears poised to infringe on the other side’s ability to use or control its nuclear arsenal. For example, conventional military attacks by one side against the other’s command and control networks, air defenses, early warning radars, submarines, and missile sites have the potential not only to degrade that side’s conventional capabilities but also its nuclear capabilities. After all, command and control networks for conventional forces may also be relevant to the control of nuclear weapons; air defense systems may protect both conventional and nuclear assets; early warning radars are relevant to both conventional and nuclear operations; attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines share shore-based infrastructure, with the former often protecting the latter; and the same sites can house both conventional and nuclear missiles (called co-location).

For all of these reasons, a state subject to attack on these targets may have a difficult time distinguishing whether the adversary is merely conducting a normal conventional campaign, or is seeking to neuter the state’s nuclear capabilities. If the state fears the latter, it may wish to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Such fears also could lead the state to engage in behaviors that make other pathways to escalation more likely. For example, the state could opt for more decentralized control of nuclear weapons, which would reduce vulnerability to conventional counterforce but heighten the danger of unauthorized launch.

### A2 Interdependence

#### Confrontation is inevitable – interdependence is overshadowed by CCP attempts to appease intense popular nationalism

Dastjerdi 15 – Ali Dasterjdi, Author for the Harvard Political Review (this dude won NCFLs in High School), Dec 16 2015(“The Case for Credible Chinese Deterrence,” Harvard Political Review, <http://harvardpolitics.com/united-states/case-credible-chinese-deterrence/>, Accessed 6/30/15, AJ)

Further, the Chinese Communist Party, China’s singular political party, is highly nationalistic and prioritizes the stability of its own rule above all else. As China braces itself for slower economic growth than it has enjoyed for the past two decades, the CCP will have to find ways to keep its population content. The CCP has reason for concern because of historic trends that point to a relationship between domestic upheaval and times of economic distress preceded by a prolonged period of increased prosperity. Beyond this, the CCP faces various challenges ranging from public desire for greater democratization to discontent with local judiciary and governing bodies.

The CCP has historically used nationalism as a tool for equating its internal individual interests to that of the whole nation, but nationalism seems to be on the rise. The current General Secretary of the CCP and President of China, Xi Jinping, rose with a message of rebuilding national greatness and achieving the “strong-army dream.” After the most recent Chinese market crash, nationalistic rhetoric stemming from party officials all across the country spiked. China will mostly likely for now and for the foreseeable future use nationalism as a catch-all solution for externalizing the discontent of its population.

Nationalism breaks down one of the primary arguments for China’s peaceful rise. Some commentators have posited that an economic prioritization coupled with high levels of economic interdependence leave China with no choice but to refrain from escalatory military strategies. It is largely correct that leaders care about the economic well being of their people, but this concern is often overshadowed by political considerations.

We only need to look back twenty years to find a clear example. During the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96, the Chinese military engaged in coercive tactics to influence the Taiwanese elections. Their strategists understood that these military tactics were aggressive enough to justify a strong economic retaliation by the United States and its East Asian allies. China’s level of economic interdependence twenty years ago was less than what it is today, but regardless, a significant economic deterrent was insufficient to prevent antagonistic military policy. China backed off from its military campaign against Taiwan only when the United States shifted its offshore military deployment in East Asia to a more confrontational position.

Despite immense potential costs, China has always held a steadfast policy of military confrontation in a world where Taiwan declares independence. The overly optimistic view of a conflict-free hyper-globalized world is simply not grounded in realty when it comes to China.

## No Conflict

### **Generic**

#### No ECS or SCS war – it’s all posturing

Cronin 15 – Patrick M. Cronin, Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, Feb 27, 2015(“Countering China’s Maritime Coercion,” The Diplomat, Available online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/02/countering-chinas-maritime-coercion/>, Accessed 6/22/16, AJ)

Is China-U.S. competition for primacy in Asia this century’s greatest threat to peace? Some analysts think so. But in leaping from Sino-American competition to potential world war, they miss the obvious: Chinese leaders probe, seize opportunities, and challenge the international system with creeping assertions of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. Yet they have no intention of sparking war, and they know that American, Japanese and other leaders are equally averse to risking so much over something as arcane as maritime boundaries and rights.

### Diplomacy

#### No SCS conflict – China will resort to diplomacy and negotiations – expert consensus

Baculinao 16 – Eric Baculinao, Reporter for NBC News, Jan 24th 2016(“China will not initiate military conflict over Island Disputes: Expert,” NBC News, <http://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/china-will-not-initiate-military-conflict-over-island-disputes-expert-n501851>, Accessed 6/29/16, AJ)

BEIJING — China will not start a war over disputed islands in the South China Sea amid recent muscle-flexing, experts with close links to the country's government told NBC News.

"We will not initiate military conflict to recover islands illegally occupied by other countries," said Wu Shicun, the former foreign affairs chief of Hainan province, an island in the South China Sea. "Our stand is to resort to negotiations [with] the countries directly involved, to resolve the territorial and maritime disputes."

Wu is the president of the National Institute of South China Sea Studies and acts as a sort of unofficial spokesman on the issue for the government of President Xi Jinping.

China claims almost all of the South China Sea, including reclaimed coral reefs known as the Spratly Islands that sit in an area thought to be rich in oil and gas reserves. Beijing has built runways, seaports and other facilities on the Spratlys.

The U.S. — as well as Vietnam, the Philippines and Japan, which have overlapping claims with China — condemn Beijing's moves in the region. Washington has vowed to defend freedom of passage through the waters.

"Make no mistake, the United States will fly, sail and operate wherever international law allows, as we do around the world, and the South China Sea is not and will not be an exception," Defense Secretary Ash Carter said on October 13.

On Oct. 27, a U.S. destroyer sailed within 12 nautical miles of the Spratlys in an open challenge to Beijing.

Related: China Accuses U.S. of 'Serious Military Provocation'

Shi Yinhong, a senior foreign policy scholar at Renmin University of China and foreign policy adviser to the government, agreed with Wu that Beijing was unlikely to "launch unprovoked war."

"Other countries have also said the same, and this is all helpful for peace and stability in the South China Sea," he said. "There will be measures to slow things down. China will adopt a new diplomacy to try to lower tensions with the U.S. and other relevant countries."

Fiery Cross reef, located in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, on Sept. 3, 2015. Handout / Reuters

While insisting that China "will not initiate hostilities," Wu stuck by Beijing's line that building on the reclaimed Spratlys was "within China's sovereign rights," denying a Pentagon report that they could extend China's military reach.

"Any military facilities we build on them will be to secure the safety of Chinese personnel and installations involved," Wu said. "Any ordinary person can tell that these tiny outposts cannot play a major role in any military conflict."

Being would be open to sharing oil and gas resources under what he called "joint development" agreements in areas under Chinese control, he said.

According to Wu, a 1999 incident should be seen as a sign that China would not resort to violence over such disputes. That was when Philippines deliberately grounded a warship on the disputed Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratlys to claim the atoll. The Philippines keeps a handful of marines on the wrecked and rusting warship to this day.

"China has been exercising great restraint," Hong Lei, the spokesman for China's Foreign Ministry told NBC News when asked about the ongoing dispute on Second Thomas Shoal. "We maintain that relevant disputes should be resolved between parties directly concerned through dialogues and consultation on the basis of historical facts and international laws. China and other countries should work together to maintain peace and stability of the region."

### Interdependence

#### Interdependence and public weariness prevent SCS conflict – checks back miscalc

Desker 15 – Barry Desker, Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of Southeast Asia Policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, November 6th 2015(“South China Sea Tensions Unlikely to Lead to War,” East Asia Forum, Available online at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/11/06/south-china-sea-tensions-unlikely-to-lead-to-war/, Accessed online on 6/27/16, AJ)

Still, as major powers, the United States and China will focus on the management of their differences. The two countries have already held a video conference. And, although China emphasised that there is a risk of ‘a minor incident that sparks war’, both sides agreed to maintain the dialogue and to follow agreed protocols to prevent clashes. Scheduled port visits by US and Chinese ships and planned visits to China by senior US Navy officers remain on track.

Self-interest means China and the United States are unlikely to miscalculate and rush into war. It would be difficult to convince a weary American public to embark on another major overseas conflict. And China’s leadership has an interest in avoiding war so that it can continue to focus on economic development.

Despite some assertions otherwise, a rising China does not mean that there is a considerable risk of war as China challenges the dominance of the United States. An increasingly confident China has also recently promoted economic policies designed to strengthen its ties to Southeast Asia, such as its ‘One Belt, One Road’ polices to establish a Maritime Silk Road linking East Asia to the Middle East

Still, China’s security strategy run the risk of alienating regional opinion and has made it easier for competitors, such as the United States and Japan, to reinforce their ties with states in the region. The exceptions to this are states bordering China, like Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Despite the resistance in the region, Southeast Asian states should expect a more assertive China in the years ahead.

As China rises, Chinese policymakers recognise that the only power with the capacity to threaten Chinese interests is the United States and its web of alliance relationships. This has resulted in a Chinese re-balancing with a tilt eastwards towards the Pacific.

In the decade ahead, there will be a strengthening of Chinese air and sea defence capabilities and a growing emphasis on building closer economic and political ties with the littoral states on the Maritime Silk Road. But, as the United States will remain a Pacific power, effective management of the US–China relationship into the future will be the critical issue for maintaining global peace and security.

#### No SCS escalation - Asymmetric interdependence and economic geography make war un-strategic for China

Pietrucha 15 – Mike Pietrucha, Military advisor and Author at the War on the Rocks, Nov 4 2015(“THE ECONOMICS OF WAR WITH CHINA: THIS WILL HURT YOU MORE THAN IT HURTS ME,” War on the Rocks, Available on <http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-economics-of-war-with-china-this-will-hurt-you-more-than-it-hurts-me/>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

The ongoing competition between the People’s Republic of China and the United States in the Pacific is at a low simmer. Despite public friction over the U.S. Navy’s freedom of navigation operations, Chinese island construction in the South China Sea, and massive Chinese cyberespionage, relations between United States and China are not particularly adversarial. The United States has a vested interest in the status quo, a position that some Chinese writers view as an unfair and unrealistic constraint on Chinese ambition. Yet relations have not degenerated into the kind of brinkmanship typical of U.S.–Soviet relations in the 1980s, or even U.S.–Russian relations today. The robust trade relationship between the United States and China dwarfs the limited trade between the United States and the Soviet Union, leading many analysts to conclude that open conflict today is unrealistic because of a presumed equal economic impact on both sides. A cursory analysis reveals that the reality is entirely different: Sino–American economic ties are asymmetrically interdependent rather than mutually dependent. This would strongly favor the United States in any conflict.

Even within the Department of Defense, there are occasional traces of the opinion that the economic ties between the two nations would effectively prevent any open war. Under this assumption, the interdependence of the two nations acts as a barrier to escalation. This position is not new. British parliamentarian Richard Cobden wrote extensively about economic coercion and the obsolescence of British military might, starting some 30 years before the Civil War broke out in the United States. In 1909, Sir Norman Angell published the Great Illusion, arguing that European economic interdependence effectively rendered militarism obsolete. Five years later, the tinderbox that was early 20th-century Europe exploded into the most devastating war in over 250 years. Even when the Great War ground to a halt, it set the stage for a worse one only 21 years later. The willingness to slug it out with economic partners was not limited to Europe, either. In the Pacific, the United States was Japan’s largest trading partner in 1940 when Japan signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy. In 1940 the trade volume between the United States and Japan had been on a steady increase throughout the Great Depression despite the U.S. embargo on scrap metal. In fact, Japan set itself on a course for war with virtually all of its major trading partners, more or less simultaneously.

Clearly, there are some credible doubts about the very idea that economic interdependence will prevent big wars. In many cases, warfare erupts between countries sharing borders over which trade routinely flows in peacetime. As world trade relationships have become increasingly globalized, the possibility exists that conflict could erupt with significant disruptive effects beyond the proximate combatants — similar to the effects observed from the Tanker War in the Persian Gulf. But we should not bank on the idea that trade interdependence will forestall conflict. The emergence of an effective global trade network may ensure that while markets may be disrupted, they can be rapidly reconstituted.

With respect to Sino–American trade, the economic effects of open warfare are heavily biased against China. For the exchange of goods, China’s top trade partners are the United States, Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and Germany, respectively. This places China in the center of a trade network that is dominated by countries which maintain a formal defense alliance with the United States. With the exception of Hong Kong, China’s top trade partners have a formal defense treaty with the United States. In fact, countries that have a bilateral (Japan, Korea) or multilateral (ANZUS, NATO) defense agreement with the United States account for over 44 percent of Chinese exports and are a source for over 45 percent of the country’s imports. In contrast, the top five partners for the United States (goods only) are Canada, China, Mexico, Japan, and Germany, with China accounting for 9 percent of our imports and 22 percent of our exports. That is a major trade imbalance, even before allied nations are taken into account. In 2014, the United States imported over $467 billion worth of goods from China while exporting $124 billion.

The goods exchanged are likewise not symmetrical. The main products that the United States receives from China are computers, broadcasting equipment, phones, office machine parts and furniture, while exporting soybeans, aircraft, automobiles, integrated circuits, and raw cotton. Viewed in total, China gets raw materials and the products of advanced, and complex manufacturing, while the United States gets consumer goods. The United States imports consumer goods that are assembled in China from parts not manufactured there — as the supply chain analysis for the iPhone reveals.

The United States thus has the upper hand in a cessation of trade goods, but also in terms of economic geography. Because of the extremely limited capacity of its cross-border links, China is effectively an island nation, and is hemmed in by unfavorable maritime terrain that the United States can exploit. The United States has also been described as an island nation by strategic theorists, but of its four coasts, two are entirely out of China’s reach, leaving only the Pacific and Alaskan coasts subject to China’s very limited power projection capability. Operating in the Eastern Pacific, outside their air defense and missile umbrella, would be extremely challenging for China in the face of overwhelming U.S. air and maritime superiority. Conversely, because of the maritime chokepoints stretching from the Straits of Malacca to Japan, China’s maritime trade can be interdicted by an offshore control or strategic interdiction campaign from well outside the ability of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to credibly project power.

#### China won’t escalate – causes China economic collapse

Pietrucha 15 – Mike Pietrucha, Military advisor and Author at the War on the Rocks, Nov 4 2015(“THE ECONOMICS OF WAR WITH CHINA: THIS WILL HURT YOU MORE THAN IT HURTS ME,” War on the Rocks, Available on <http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-economics-of-war-with-china-this-will-hurt-you-more-than-it-hurts-me/>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

In the event of actual hostilities, commercial interests will do much of the interdiction work for the United States. Maritime insurance policies do not typically cover either ship hulls or cargos in a war zone and additional riders must be purchased at substantial cost, if available at all. Besides Chinese-flagged vessels, commercial carriers might be unwilling to travel to Chinese ports at all, particularly if the United States conducts a modern offensive mining campaign. In such a case, the flow of raw materials, particularly energy, to China (particularly energy) could come to a shuddering halt, while the United States suffers a much more limited effect. China is dependent on ocean movement for over 96 percent of its foreign trade, with no viable overland alternatives. A maritime interdiction effort would interrupt the majority of China’s international trade from the majority of trading partners and cut 90 percent of total petroleum imports, leaving China with an unprecedented oil crisis and a shortfall of more than half of the country’s total oil consumption.

#### China war hurts the economies of adversaries but resiliency solves collapse.

Pietrucha 15 – Mike Pietrucha, Military advisor and Author at the War on the Rocks, Nov 4 2015(“THE ECONOMICS OF WAR WITH CHINA: THIS WILL HURT YOU MORE THAN IT HURTS ME,” War on the Rocks, Available on <http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/the-economics-of-war-with-china-this-will-hurt-you-more-than-it-hurts-me/>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Nevertheless, while Japan and Korea would suffer from a loss of trade with China, they are not in the same position whereby outside trade is easily interdicted. If a conflict erupted, maritime traffic which would normally pass through the Straits of Malacca will have to take the long way around, possibly doubling voyage time to avoid the waters adjoining the Chinese coast; but those trade routes need not pass through Chinese waters. Trade from the Americas need not deviate at all. Korea is more exposed to Chinese countermaritime efforts than Japan, given that some ports in both countries face China. However, the majority of South Korea’s port facilities border the Sea of Japan and not the Yellow Sea, which is shared with China and potentially very dangerous sailing. Japan’s ports largely face east and an interdiction effort by China would prove challenging. Again, the effect of a maritime threat is asymmetrical because both Korea and Japan have ready access to “friendly” waters while China does not.

The United States is not similarly constrained. The Pacific coast is not geographically hemmed in and the nearest island owned by an Asian country is Ostrov Mednyy, some 2500 nautical miles from Neah Bay, Washington. If the PRC could somehow force the closure of all 29 West Coast ports, it would affect barely a quarter of international trade. While significant, periodic labor disruptions have demonstrated that an effective West Coast port shutdown is not an economic catastrophe for the United States. From an energy standpoint, West Coast ports import about 40 million barrels of fuels and crude oil per month, barely 14 percent of the total U.S. import demand and 7 percent of the actual domestic consumption.

Chinese ports are comparatively far more vulnerable. Of the top ten container ports in the world, seven are Chinese. Los Angeles and Long Beach rank 19th and 21st with New York at 27th. Chinese ports are also transshipment centers, meaning that a large volume of traffic stops there and is then loaded on another ship headed to another destination. This makes Chinese ports vulnerable (from a business standpoint) to interdiction in a way that West Coast ports are not. It is likely that shipping trends will realign rather than transit through a war zone and this realignment may have lasting consequences. Normally, market forces drive a slow shift in transportation patterns, while a crisis could drive rapid changes. In early 2015, as the West Coast port dispute between the Pacific Maritime Association and the union continued, Vancouver saw a 15-percent jump in traffic in a month as the shipping market realigned away from U.S. ports.

### US Retreating

#### US is retreating in the SCS – we recognized their artificial islands

Cheng 15 – Dean Cheng, Journalist for Breaking Defense, November 29th 2015(“US ‘Steadily Retreating’ in South China Sea Dispute,” Breaking Defense, <http://breakingdefense.com/2015/11/us-steadily-retreating-in-south-china-sea-dispute/>, Accessed 6/29/16, AJ)

Reality now seems to be mirroring fiction, as the Administration steadily obscures what it means by the “rebalance” to Asia in the six weeks leading to the next episode of the “Star Wars” franchise. American B-52s and the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier battlegroup both operated in the South China Sea recently, providing ample opportunity to conduct operations within 12 nautical miles of China’s artificial islands, and clearly sending the message to Beijing and the world of the seriousness with which the United States takes freedom of the seas.

960117-N-7729M-002 (December 20, 1995).... The U.S. Navy's aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) conducts a weapons on-load with the ammunition ship USS Santa Barbara (AE 28) in the waters off the Virginia-Carolina coast, following her post deployment yard period, at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, in Portsmouth, Virginia. Official U.S. Navy Photo by Photographer's Mate 2nd. Class Michael Tuemler

USS Roosevelt

After a stymied ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, where China battled hard to stop the group from taking any stance on the South China Sea, Southeast Asia is clearly becoming the focal point of growing tensions between the United States and the People’s R epublic of China. As China continues to challenge the United States on the competing principles of sovereignty and freedom of the seas, the reefs, spits, rocks, and islands in the Spratlys have become the center of the battle

For the Chinese, the point is simple. As a Chinese admiral observed recently in London, “The South China Sea, as the name indicates, is a sea area that belongs to China. And the sea from the Han dynasty a long time ago where the Chinese people have been working and producing from the sea.” The issue is one of sovereignty, not only over the land and submerged features, but the waters, the “blue soil” that is encompassed within the “nine-dash line,” now more prominently noted in recent Chinese maps.

For the United States, the point is almost equally straightforward. Washington takes no position on the disputes over sovereignty in the South China Sea, but it is firmly committed to the principle of freedom of the seas. All states may use the high seas as they see fit, as they are free for use by all. Conversely, no state may arbitrarily seek to lay claim to swathes of the ocean—and reefs do not exert any justification for territorial claims, even if one builds an artificial island atop it.

Ostensibly as a show of commitment to the principle of freedom of the seas, the USS Theodore Roosevelt operated in the South China Sea, providing a perfect venue for Secretary of Defense Carter to make a speech on this issue. This comes a fortnight after the Administration finally authorized a US ship to transit waters near China’s artificial islands, five months after it stated that American ships would sail where they wished, and three years after the last freedom of navigation operation (FONOP).

Unfortunately, if several recent reports are to be believed, these American ship transits are demonstrating not strength, but weakness.

As it turns out, the USS Lassen reportedly did not engage in a FONOPS to demonstrate that the islands China has built exert no right to territorial waters reaching out 12 nautical miles. Instead, the U.S. ship reportedly conducted “innocent passage,” turning off its radars and grounding its helicopters as it transited within 12 nautical miles of the islands. Undertaking “innocent passage” is done only in another nation’s territorial waters.

In short, the United States, by its actions, may have actually recognized China’s claims. If the reports are correct, the United States treated the artificial island atop Subi Reef as though it were a naturally occurring feature, and therefore entitled to a 12 nautical mile band of territorial water. This is precisely the opposite of what had been announced.

Further obscuring the message, Administration sources are now claiming that it was both a FONOP and “innocent passage,” because the American ship was transiting waters near other islands occupied by various other claimants as well as going near Subi Reef. It would appear that the Administration was more intent on placating domestic concerns (e.g., the Senate Armed Services Committee) than in sending a clear signal.

Now, according to reports, the USS Theodore Roosevelt did not even sail within 200 nautical miles of the Chinese islands, instead avoiding the waters around them entirely. Similarly, the American B-52s underscoring freedom of navigation in the South China Sea took care to never approach more than 15 nautical miles from the artificial Chinese islands.

It is the final step in a pivot of American statements and actions that have charted a steadily retreating course. It has proceeded like this:

from Secretary of Defense Carter’s declaration at Shangri-La this May that “the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows, as U.S. forces do all over the world;”

to the revelation to the Senate Armed Services Committee this summer that the United States, in fact, has not sailed or operated near China’s artificial islands for three years;

to the apparent concession on international law, five months later, by the Lassen’s “innocent passage” transit, effectively acceding to the Chinese version on the key principle of freedom of the seas;

to the apparent decision to have the USS Theodore Roosevelt and American B-52s avoid those waters and airspace altogether, a message that is being sent less than a month after the Lassen

Like it or not, the message that the White House is now repeatedly sending is that the United States, in fact, accepts that the Chinese artificial islands should be treated as national territory, like a natural feature. In short, the United States is acceding to China’s efforts to close off portions of the open ocean. Teddy Roosevelt’s catch-phrase, of course, was “Speak softly, but carry a big stick.” To deliver this craven message via the routing of a ship named for him adds a grotesquely ironic twist to the decision.

#### No SCS conflict - confrontation severely outweighs the benefits.

Li and Yanzhou 15 – Xue Li, Director of the Department of International Strategy at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Xu Yanzhou, doctorate from Durham University (UK) in December 2014 and studies international responsibility, South China Sea disputes, and Chinese foreign policy, June 19th 2015(“The US and China won’t see Military Conflict over the South China Sea,” The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-us-and-china-wont-see-military-conflict-over-the-south-china-sea/>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

As a global hegemon, the United States’ main interest lies in maintaining the current international order as well as peace and stability. Regarding the South China Sea, U.S. interests include ensuring peace and stability, freedom of commercial navigation, and military activities in exclusive economic zones. Maintaining the current balance of power is considered to be a key condition for securing these interests—and a rising China determined to strengthen its hold on South China Sea territory is viewed as a threat to the current balance of power. In response, the U.S. launched its “rebalance to Asia” strategy. In practice, the U.S. has on the one hand strengthened its military presence in Asia-Pacific, while on the other hand supporting ASEAN countries, particularly ASEAN claimants to South China Sea territories.

This position has included high-profile rhetoric by U.S. officials. In 2010, then-U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi about the South China Sea, remarks that aligned the U.S. with Southeast Asia’s approach to the disputes. At the 2012 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta explained how the United States will rebalance its force posture as part of playing a “deeper and more enduring partnership role” in the Asia-Pacific region. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel called out China’s “destabilizing, unilateral activities asserting its claims in the South China Sea.” His remarks also came at the Shangri-La dialogue, while China’s HY-981 oil rig was deployed in the waters around the Paracel Islands. In 2015, U.S. officials have openly pressured China to scale back its construction work in the Spratly islands and have sent aircraft to patrol over islands in the Spratly that are controlled by China. These measures have brought global attention to the South China Sea.

However, if we look at the practical significance of the remarks, there are several limiting factors. The interests at stake in the South China Sea are not core national interests for the United States. Meanwhile, the U.S.-Philippine alliance is not as important as the U.S.-Japan alliance, and U.S. ties with other ASEAN countries are even weaker. Given U.S.-China mutual economic dependence and China’s comprehensive national strength, the United States is unlikely to go so far as having a military confrontation with China over the South China Sea. Barack Obama, the ‘peace president’ who withdrew the U.S. military from Iraq and Afghanistan, is even less likely to fight with China for the South China Sea.

As for the U.S. interests in the region, Washington is surely aware that China has not affected the freedom of commercial navigation in these waters so far. And as I noted in my earlier piece, Beijing is developing its stance and could eventually recognize the legality of military activities in another country’s EEZ (see, for example, the China-Russia joint military exercise in the Mediterranean).

Yet when it comes to China’s large-scale land reclamation in the Spratly Islands (and on Woody Island in the Paracel Islands), Washington worries that Beijing will conduct a series of activities to strengthen its claims on the South China Sea, such as establishing an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) or advocating that others respect a 200-nautical mile (370 km) EEZ from its islands. Meanwhile, the 2014 oil rig incident taught Washington that ASEAN claimants and even ASEAN as a whole could hardly play any effective role in dealing with China’s land reclamation. Hence, the U.S. has no better choice than to become directly involved in this issue.

At the beginning, the United States tried to stop China through private diplomatic mediation, yet it soon realized that this approach was not effective in persuading China. So Washington started to tackle the issue in a more aggressive way, such as encouraging India, Japan, ASEAN, the G7, and the European Union to pressure Beijing internationally. Domestically, U.S. officials from different departments and different levels have opposed China’s ‘changing the status quo’ in this area.

Since 2015, Washington has increased its pressure on China. It sent the USS Fort Worth, a littoral combat ship, to sail in waters near the Spratly area controlled by Vietnam in early May. U.S. official are also considering sending naval and air patrols within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands controlled by China.

Washington has recognized that it could hardly stop China’s construction in Spratly Islands. Therefore, it has opted to portray Beijing as a challenger to the status quo, at the same time moving to prevent China from establishing a South China Sea ADIZ and an EEZ of 200 nautical miles around its artificial islands. This was the logic behind the U.S. sending a P-8A surveillance plane with reporters on board to approach three artificial island built by China. China issued eight warnings to the plane; the U.S. responded by saying the plane was flying through international airspace.

Afterwards, U.S. Defense Department spokesman, Army Col. Steve Warren, said there could be a potential “freedom of navigation” exercise within 12 nautical miles of the artificial islands. If this approach were adopted, it would back China into a corner; hence it’s a unlikely the Obama administration will make that move.

As the U.S. involvement in the South China Sea becomes more aggressive and high-profile, the dynamic relationship between China and the United States comes to affect other layers of the dispute (for example, relations between China and ASEAN claimants or China and ASEAN in general). To some extent, the South China Sea dispute has developed into a balance of power tug-of-war between the U.S. and China, yet both sides will not take the risk of military confrontation. As Foreign Minister Wang Yi put it in a recent meeting with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, “as for the differences, our attitude is it is okay to have differences as long as we could avoid misunderstanding, and even more importantly, avoid miscalculation.”

For its part, China is determined to build artificial islands and several airstrips in the Spratlys, which I argue would help promote the resolution of SCS disputes. But it’s worth noting that if China establishes an ADIZ and advocates a 200 nautical miles EEZ (as the U.S. fears), it would push ASEAN claimants and even non-claimants to stand by the United States. Obviously, the potential consequences contradict with China’s “One Belt, One Road” strategy.

In February 2014, in response to reports by Japan’s Asahi Shimbun that a South China Sea ADIZ was imminent, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs hinted that China would not necessarily impose an ADIZ. “The Chinese side has yet to feel any air security threat from the ASEAN countries and is optimistic about its relations with the neighboring countries and the general situation in the South China Sea region,” a spokesperson said.

Since the “Belt and Road” is Beijing’s primary strategic agenda for the coming years, it is crucial for China to strengthen its economic relationship with ASEAN on the one hand while reducing ASEAN claimants’ security concerns on the other hand. As a result, it should accelerate the adjustment of its South China Sea policy; clarify China’s stand on the issue, and propose China’s blueprint for resolving the disputes.

The South China Sea dispute has developed a seasonal pattern, where the first half of the year is focused on conflicts, and the second half tends to emphasize cooperation. Considering its timing at the peak of ‘conflict season,’ the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as a hot spot. Since 2012, the Shangri-La Dialogue has become a platform for the U.S. and China to tussle on the South China Sea, with the U.S. being proactive and China reactive. (Incidentally, this partly explains why China is upgrading Xiangshan Forum as an alternative dialogue platform). This year was no exception, as the U.S. worked hard to draw the world’s attention to the Shangri-La Dialogue this year.

## Counter Deterrence CP

### Note

#### This CP can probably work in the ECS too if you just unhiglight the one SCS portion in the CP and then change the text of the CP.

#### Answers to this CP can also be found in Pressure CP answers since both say deterrence bad.

### 1NC - SCS

#### Text: The United States federal government should substantially increase its deployment of Expeditionary Mobile Bases in the South China Sea.

#### Solves Chinese aggression through deterrence and restrained power projection.

Barno & Bensahel 6/14 – David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Lt. General David W. Barno, USA (Ret.) is a Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, and Dr. Nora Bensahel is a Distinguished Scholar in Residence, at the School of International Service at American University. Both also serve as Nonresident Senior Fellows at the Atlantic Council., June 14 2016(“A Guide to stepping it up in the South China Sea,” War on the Rocks, <http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/a-guide-to-stepping-it-up-in-the-south-china-sea/>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Build floating U.S. bases in the South China Sea. The United States could respond to Beijing’s artificial islands by building temporary afloat bases that would sustain a greater U.S. and international presence. It could position one or more Expeditionary Mobile Bases (ESBs, formerly called Afloat Staging Bases) in the South China Sea, which could act as small, mobile floating bases that can project power in a number of ways, including basing helicopters and special operations forces. The United States could also re-energize the development of the long-studied Joint Mobile Offshore Base (JMOB). In the future, a series of JMOBs could serve as mobile forward sea bases (like multiple joined oil platforms) in the region, large enough to support large fixed wing air transports and stationing hundreds or even thousands of troops. The Chinese are assessing this capability as well, but have achieved much the same effect by their island-building program.

The great advantage of ESBs and JMOBs is that they can support a wide range of less provocative non-combat operations, such as maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, counter-piracy, and humanitarian relief. Crewing both platforms with a combination of Coast Guard and civilian sailors — potentially from other countries as well as from the United States — could reduce the risk that China would see this as a stark military escalation. It could provide a valuable dual-use capability for the United States, supporting important missions on a regular basis (including the Coast Guard patrols mentioned above), but also enabling the United States to rapidly improve its regional power projection capabilities in the event of a conflict.

### 2NC – Deterrence

#### Deterrence is the only effective method to promote freedom of navigation.

Freedberg 6-3, Sydney Freedberg, Deputy Editor for Breaking Defense, 6-3-16(“US must Do More in South China Sea, urges Sen. McCain,” Breaking Defense, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/06/us-must-do-more-in-south-china-sea-urges-sen-mccain/>, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

SINGAPORE: In a clear message to the Obama Administration, our Pacific partners and to China, Sen. John McCain says the US military is not doing enough to challenge Chinese claims in the strategic South China Sea. Nor is the US doing enough to ratify the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade pact, a vital economic objective in the region, the senator said on the eve of the Shangri-La conference here.

“We have not,” McCain said bluntly when I asked him after his speech here whether the US had done enough Freedom Of Navigation Operations (FONOP) to challenge China’s claims. “We have sort of made it a signal event when we sailed a destroyer within the 12-mile limit” — the “territorial sea” claimed by China around its islets — “and at one point the Department of Defense wouldn’t even acknowledge we had done that.

“We should make it clear that these are international waters and filling in islands is in violation of international law,” McCain said. “I would like to see both air and ship transiting the areas around these islands as just a normal routine.”

## A2 Counter Deterrence CP

### 2AC - Deterrence Fails

#### Deterrence fails – it results in a violent action-reaction cycle that increases possibility for conflict.

Dong 13 – Wang Dong, associate professor of School of International Studies and director of the Center for Northeast Asian Strategic Studies at Peking University, January 17 2013(“Addressing the US-China Security Dilemma,” Carnegie Endownment for International Peace, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/01/17/addressing-u.s.-china-security-dilemma>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

But many analysts now agree that increasing strategic distrust between China and the United States in recent years has posed significant challenges not only to U.S.-China relations but also to regional peace and security at large. Since the end of 2009, the United States and China have drifted apart. The two powers are increasingly trapped in an action-reaction cycle, so much so that many lament that the United States and China are doomed for a “strategic collision.”

Underlying the growing strategic distrust is an emerging security dilemma—a situation in which one state’s efforts to enhance its own security will lead others to feel less secure—between Beijing and Washington. Both the Chinese public and elite believe that the Obama administration’s pivot or rebalancing to Asia is a thinly veiled attempt to restrain and counterbalance, if not encircle or contain, a rising China. And many U.S. officials and analysts perceive an increasingly assertive China that does not shy away from flexing its muscles, “bullying” its neighbors, and pursuing its “narrow” interests relentlessly.

Numerous moves by the Obama administration have all been perceived in China as evidence of U.S. hostility toward Beijing. These moves have included deploying U.S. Marines to Darwin, Australia; asserting U.S. interests in freedom of navigation in the South China Sea; bolstering military alliances with the Philippines, Japan, and Australia; enhancing security cooperation with Vietnam and India; improving bilateral relations with Myanmar; and beefing up the United States’ ballistic missile defense systems in East Asia.

Going forward, the United States will continue to hedge against the rise of China and perceived Chinese assertiveness. It will strengthen its deterrence posture, build up its forward deployment, and reinforce military alliances and security partnerships in Asia. Yet, because of the almost-inevitable shrinking of the U.S. defense budget, it remains to be seen whether Washington can match its rhetoric with action.

Interestingly, quite a number of American analysts have become critical of the Obama administration’s handling of the U.S. pivot or rebalancing to Asia, particularly of the way it was rolled out. Now, even the administration officials have acknowledged that too much emphasis was initially put on the military and security aspects of the pivot. In that sense, the U.S. rebalancing strategy itself needs to be “rebalanced.” It is likely that the second Obama administration will recalibrate its approach by putting more emphasis on economic cooperation and people-to-people exchanges in the Asia-Pacific, including with China.

The way the Chinese leadership transition is structured and institutionalized ensures continuity and predictability in China’s foreign policy. Around the time President Obama was elected to a second term, the Chinese leadership too changed. At the 18th Congress of the Communist Party of China, a new Standing Committee of the Politburo was elected. Xi Jinping, who has been China’s vice president since 2008, assumed the positions of general secretary of the Central Committee and chairman of the Central Military Commission. He and Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, respectively, will almost certainly assume the presidency and premiership at the National People’s Congress meeting next March.

Both men have been in senior leadership positions for many years. Other members of the top leadership have also been in senior posts for quite some time. The new Chinese leadership will maintain strong consensuses on major domestic and foreign policy agendas, which prioritize the continuation of deeper reform and China’s peaceful development.

Looking ahead, the U.S.-China relationship is entering a challenging period. How the relationship between China and the United States is to be managed is a question that will define the strategic landscape of the Asia-Pacific in the twenty-first century. China and the United States should not allow themselves to be engulfed by mutual hostility and suspicion, blindness to the effects their actions have on the relationship, misperceptions, and the fatalistic pessimism inherent in a hardcore realist mentality. Rather, they should accurately gauge each other’s strategic intentions and try to increase mutual strategic understanding and trust through candid discussion and exchanges at the highest level of leadership.

### 2AC – Solvency Deficit

#### Deterrence destroys all possibility of cooperation with China.

Larter 4-6, David Larter, Journalist for the Navy Times, 4-6-16(“4-Star Admiral wants to confront china: White house says not so fast,” Navy Times, <http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/04/06/4-star-admiral-wants-confront-china-white-house-says-not-so-fast/82472290/>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

The U.S. military’s top commander in the Pacific is arguing behind closed doors for a more confrontational approach to counter and reverse China’s strategic gains in the South China Sea, appeals that have met resistance from the White House at nearly every turn.

Adm. Harry Harris is proposing a muscular U.S. response to China's island-building that may include launching aircraft and conducting military operations within 12 miles of these man-made islands, as part of an effort to stop what he has called the "Great Wall of Sand" before it extends within 140 miles from the Philippines' capital, sources say.

Harris and his U.S. Pacific Command have been waging a persistent campaign in public and in private over the past several months to raise the profile of China's land grab, accusing China outright in February of militarizing the South China Sea

But the Obama administration, with just nine months left in office, is looking to work with China on a host of other issues from nuclear non-proliferation to an ambitious trade agenda, experts say, and would prefer not to rock the South China Sea boat, even going so far as to muzzle Harris and other military leaders in the run-up to a security summit.

“They want to get out of office with a minimum of fuss and a maximum of cooperation with China,” said Jerry Hendrix, a retired Navy captain and defense strategy analyst with the Center for a New American Security.

The White House has sought to tamp down on rhetoric from Harris and other military leaders, who are warning that China is consolidating its gains to solidify sovereignty claims to most of the South China Sea.

National Security Adviser Susan Rice imposed a gag order on military leaders over the disputed South China Sea in the weeks running up to the last week's high-level nuclear summit, according to two defense officials who asked for anonymity to discuss policy deliberations. China's president, Xi Jinping, attended the summit, held in Washington, and met privately with President Obama.

The order was part of the notes from a March 18 National Security Council meeting and included a request from Rice to avoid public comments on China's recent actions in the South China Sea, said a defense official familiar with the meeting readout.

In issuing the gag order, Rice intended to give Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping "maximum political maneuvering space" during their one-on-one meeting during the global Nuclear Summit held March 31 through April 1, the official said.

“Sometimes it’s OK to talk about the facts and point out what China is doing, and other times it's not,” the official familiar with the memo said. “Meanwhile, the Chinese have been absolutely consistent in their messaging.”

The NSC dictum has had a “chilling effect” within the Pentagon that discouraged leaders from talking publicly about the South China Sea at all, even beyond the presidential summit, according to a second defense official familiar with operational planning. Push-back from the NSC has become normal in cases where it thinks leaders have crossed the line into baiting the Chinese into hard-line positions, sources said.

Military leaders interpreted this as an order to stay silent on China's assertive moves to control most of the South China Sea, said both defense officials, prompting concern that the paltry U.S. response may embolden the Chinese and worry U.S. allies in the region, like Japan and the Philippines, who feel bullied.

China, which has been constructing islands and airstrips atop reefs and rocky outcroppings in the Spratly Islands, sees the South China Sea as Chinese territory. President Xi told Obama during their meeting at the nuclear summit that China would not accept any behavior in the disguise of freedom of navigation that violates its sovereignty, according to a Reuters report. The two world leaders did agree to work together on nuclear and cyber security issues.

Experts say administrations often direct military leaders to tone down their rhetoric ahead of major talks, but the current directive comes at a difficult juncture. U.S. leaders are struggling to find an effective approach to stopping the island-building without triggering a confrontation.

## Maritime Transparency CP

### Notes

#### This CP can be used for both the SCS and the ECS as the awareness system can be used universally. You could try to run one CP that does both the SCS and ECS but it would have to be two separate planks with two separate coalitions (one for the ECS and one for the SCS). Establishing one coalition obviously wouldn’t work since many countries don’t have strategic interests in the ECS and vice versa.

#### The Thiele solvency evidence from the 1NC ECS shell is repeated in 2NC solvency since it can also apply to SCS as a general solvency advocate.

### 1NC - SCS

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a shared maritime domain awareness system between The People’s Republic of China, Vietnam, The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, and the United States.

#### MDA solves – results in transparency that engenders cooperation and shared capacity-building efforts

Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

This report proposes that enhanced, shared maritime domain awareness (MDA) – that is, a near-realtime understanding of air and sea activities – in the South China Sea is a realistic means of addressing some of the underlying and proximate problems facing this strategic waterway. A maritime domain awareness architecture may engender cooperation in a region devoid of trust, prevent misunderstandings, encourage operational transparency, and lead to capacity-building efforts that contribute to the regional public good. This study explores how advances in commercial technology services, regional information-sharing, and security cooperation can contribute to enhanced regional security. We believe these advances can do so by moving the region closer to establishing a common, layered, and regularly updated picture of air and maritime activity in the South China Sea – a common operational picture (COP) for a tempestuous domain.

The U.S. military has long relied on a common operational picture to enable command and control linking strategic decisionmakers located at headquarters elements and operational units located in the field. A COP amounts to a visualization tool for situational awareness, described more narrowly by the military as “a single identical display of relevant information shared by more than one command that facilitates collaborative planning and assists all echelons to achieve situational awareness.”5 This domain-agnostic military definition conveys that a COP is a tool for maintaining situational awareness, but not how situational awareness occurs. That requires the confidence-building, technical capacity, and commitment to stability-promoting transparency that this report explores.

### 1NC – ECS

#### Text: The United States federal government should establish a shared maritime domain awareness system between The People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the United States.

#### **MDA solves and is feasible – results in transparency that engenders cooperation and trust**

Thiele 15 – Ralph Thiele, Chairman of the Political-Military Society (pmg), Berlin, Germany and CEO at StratByrd Consulting, May 2015(“Fostering Coopeartion in East Asia via Maritime Domain Awareness,” Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190785/346_Thiele_SCOC.pdf>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) addresses the collection, fusion and dissemination of enormous quantities of data, information and knowledge drawn from military forces, government agencies, international coalition partners and forces, and commercial entities. Eventually, the depth of information collected from these various sources will be weaved together to enrich a comprehensive common operational picture that is envisioned to be shared among many users. Consequently, this concept offers attractive components to building a regime based multilateralism.

Three key components support MDA: data, information and knowledge. Once integrated these components create a substantive, layered presentation of the global maritime environment. Particularly the timely fusing of maritime information is an initial priority. Obviously, there are many sources of information, from open source white shipping such as AIS10, commercially available databases such as Lloyds, to comprehensive Intelligence fused pictures, representing national, and coalition interests. Incremental gains in data, information and knowledge sharing allow for growing transparency, trust and operational co-operation as mutual confidence builds. The purpose of MDA is to generate actionable knowledge. Sharing Knowledge is absolutely essential if this growing network is to effectively detect, identify and track the most dangerous threats, including terrorists, WMD, narcotics, piracy, mass migrations, and arms traffickers. It is also very beneficial with view to a plenitude of business, logistical and administrative tasks. Awareness generated through knowledge sharing and networking will enhance understanding of the global maritime environment, including adjacent ungoverned areas in which terrorists operate or hybrid warfare takes place. The challenge will be to effectively integrate and fuse the various inputs to achieve the synergies offered by a comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness picture, while being responsive to the information needs of participating agencies.

Situational awareness is the prerequisite of maritime domain security. And it offers the implementation and further development of technologies that serve the prosperity of the region well, i.e. platform, sensor, communication, collaboration and evaluation technologies. Today technological developments such as space based systems, over the horizon radar, and near shore and harbour acoustics can be incorporated into a layered approach to increase security. Integral to enhancing MDA are screening technologies used for verification of shipments and people prior to their departure from foreign ports.

To identify and address growth potential, industry and academia have been discussing already ways in which technology, based on advanced modelling and simulation tools can be used to identify threats and determine potential impacts. Technological advances may offer some solutions to difficult challenges encountered in the MDA development effort. Areas where technology can directly contribute to enhancing MDA are in the improved detection and tracking of vessels and crafts, the ability to monitor the movement of people and cargo, and enabling appropriate access to the myriad databases and information sources which can make valuable contributions in detection and prevention.

### 2NC – Solvency

#### **MDA solves the AFF and is feasible – tech developments**

Thiele 15 – Ralph Thiele, Chairman of the Political-Military Society (pmg), Berlin, Germany and CEO at StratByrd Consulting, May 2015(“Fostering Coopeartion in East Asia via Maritime Domain Awareness,” Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190785/346_Thiele_SCOC.pdf>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

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#### **MDA solves – Europe proves**

Thiele 15 – Ralph Thiele, Chairman of the Political-Military Society (pmg), Berlin, Germany and CEO at StratByrd Consulting, May 2015(“Fostering Coopeartion in East Asia via Maritime Domain Awareness,” Institute for Strategic, Political, Security and Economic Consultancy, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/190785/346_Thiele_SCOC.pdf>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

How can a maritime regime be built to common security challenges in the absence of a resolution to competing territorial claims, to promote coordinated efforts in tackling transnational crimes such as piracy and the smuggling of people and goods as well as threats to the maritime environment such as overfishing and oil spills? Regional maritime regime building has been successful in Europe as seen in reasonably successful and comprehensive multilateral institutions for the Baltic, the North, and the Mediterranean Sea. In East Asia such a solution would require multilateral regionalism, a collaborative diplomatic process aiming to resolve the various territorial disputes without coercion. In sharp contrast, no comprehensive, multilateral maritime regime has been initiated in East Asian Seas. Here the delimitation of maritime space has evolved as a bilateral bargaining game since the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982.

China for example has insisted on bilateral negotiations to resolve these disputes. It has used all available channels to assert its position, although unilateral or bilateral efforts clearly don´t make sense with view to the interwoven character of maritime issues in East Asia. Establishing an effective regional maritime order would require the full engagement of all parties involved to include the U.S., China, Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN. At the Symposium on New Maritime Security Architecture in East Asia held in Tokyo on January 30, 2015, Ken SATO, President of the Institute for International Policy Studies, proposed the idea of an "Asian Maritime Organization for Security and Cooperation” (AMOSC), pointing out that there is no regional organization with maritime domain awareness, while such an organization is most urgently required for tackling the given challenges.10 Obviously the concept of maritime domain awareness bears potential. And this potential should be explored. The smooth exchange of information related to maritime incidents, for example, could facilitate emergency cooperation as in the case of the tragic loss of Malaysia Airlines flight MH370 in 2014. How can collaborative situation awareness be achieved? To this end it is of interest to look at a relevant development in Europe. In October 2009, the European Commission set guiding principles on how to achieve integration of maritime surveillance – a 'Common Information Sharing Environment for the surveillance of the European Union domain' ('CISE')11. It aims at creating a political, cultural, legal and technical environment to enable sharing between existing and future surveillance systems and networks. Such interoperability will be established in a decentralized way using modern technologies. It will give all concerned authorities access to the information they need for their missions at sea based on the 'need-to-know' and 'responsibility-to-share' principle.

With CISE Maritime surveillance professionals will have access to more relevant information within their existing systems and on their existing screens if maritime surveillance systems will be connected across sectors and borders at national and EU level. The idea is that information and knowledge will be exchanged near real time wherever possible and necessary. What is needed in particular is that civil and military authorities – to include coast guards and navies – will share relevant information with each other. Exactly this will be one of the main priority areas for further work. The European approach to maritime domain awareness could well serve as reference how to approach the complex issue in East Asia.12

#### CP solves – current MDA is positive but insufficient.

Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

As the Pentagon’s Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy advertises, the United States is already doing much to improve the maritime awareness capacity of select Southeast Asian countries. The United States has aided Malaysia with coastal surveillance radar stations. It is providing assistance constructing the Philippines Coast Watch System. It is transferring a number of small patrol vessels to the Philippines. And it is supporting Indonesia’s effort to enhance MDA through a number of activities. But these efforts are a pittance compared with what is needed for actionable situational awareness. Most maritime Southeast Asian militaries still lack aerial reconnaissance, rudimentary electronic warfare and signals intelligence, and airborne early warning capabilities; all have only limited maritime patrol and reconnaissance capacity. Current U.S. efforts improve regional capability only on the margins.

### 2NC – Say Yes

#### Concert nations facilitate MDA – similar goals.

Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

The United States is not the only external power interested in South China Sea transparency or in improving the maritime security capacity of ASEAN nations. Several U.S. allies and partners – Australia, India, Japan, and even South Korea (hereinafter the “Concert Nations”) – have their own defense relations in Southeast Asia as well and make use of their local ties to advance their respective interests, which include promoting exports to support their respective defense industrial bases. At best, the involvement of outside powers in this manner is inefficient and risks duplication of effort while potentially neglecting strategically important maritime security requirements of recipient governments.

South China Sea military and coast guard operations, arms sales and financing, and access agreements involving outside powers all need to be coordinated and deconflicted. Rather than toil independently and in occasional competition with others, the United States can leverage the willingness that Concert Nations have already shown to share the overall burden of building maritime awareness capacity in the South China Sea and more efficiently determine where its own contributions are most needed.

### 2NC – Transparency Key

#### SCS war likely and spills over to all regional conflicts – lack of transparency is the key issue.

Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Yet underlying these resource and sovereignty tensions is something even more pernicious: The South China Sea is an opaque, low-information environment. Most South China Sea islets are hundreds of miles from shore, making it especially difficult for governments and commercial entities to monitor events at sea when they occur. This dearth of situational awareness worsens regional competition in the South China Sea. The region is already rife with rapid military modernization, resurgent nationalism, the blurring of economic and security interests, and heightened geopolitical wrangling with China (by great and small powers alike). Left unchecked, these pressures make conflict more likely by tempting major military accidents and crises that could drag down the economic and political future of the region.

These negative trends converging in the South China Sea also create missed opportunities among regional stakeholders for positive gains. South China Sea stakeholders have many transnational and economic interests of growing importance in common – from counterpiracy to maritime commerce and disaster response – but the competitive nature of the South China Sea today impedes collective action to solve shared problems. States have trouble engaging in cooperation, even when it would advance shared interests. This challenges the foundations of a stable regional order. The more states believe they live in an anarchical neighborhood, the more likely the region sees the worst of geopolitics: security dilemmas, arms races, and policies motivated by fear and greed rather than reason and restraint.

## A2 Maritime Transparency CP

### 2AC – No Solvency

#### MDA doesn’t resolve key tensions between claimant states – the issue is not lack of knowledge but deliberate provocations.

Fuchs 4-11 – Michael Fuchs, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and was most recently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 4-11-16(“How to Turn Down the Heat in the South China Sea,” Defense One, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/how-turn-heat-down-south-china-sea/127375/>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

On April 5, Indonesia blew up 23 Malaysian and Vietnamese fishing vessels in a public display to deter others from illegally fishing in its waters. That was one day after Vietnamese state media announced that Vietnamese authorities detained a Chinese vessel accused of illegally entering Vietnamese waters. And that same week, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel forcefully freed a Chinese fishing vessel from Indonesian authorities that had detained the vessel.

This is the new normal in the South China Sea.

While this strategic patch of ocean has long seen international maritime incidents – even deadly ones – the pace has climbed rapidly in recent years.

Tensions have risen as China has taken more frequent and provocative steps to assert its authority over claimed waters, and its regional neighbors have begun to push back. In 2014, China deployed a massive oil rig in disputed waters with Vietnam, leading to clashes between vessels. Between 2013 and 2015, China dredged enough sand from the bottom of the South China Sea to build more than 2,900 acres of new land, on which it appears to be constructing bases. And ships from China and the Philippines have squared off near Scarborough Reef, Second Thomas Shoal, and elsewhere.

The incidents between claimant countries are occurring alongside an emerging U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea, with vessels from both countries increasingly challenging one another, as illustrated by journalist Helene Cooper on her recent voyage.

#### CP doesn’t solve adjudication of disputes or enforcement.

Fuchs 4-11 – Michael Fuchs, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, and was most recently Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 4-11-16(“How to Turn Down the Heat in the South China Sea,” Defense One, <http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2016/04/how-turn-heat-down-south-china-sea/127375/>, Accessed 7/1/16, AJ)

Second, countries must take the very difficult step of living up to their commitments not to respond to incursions into perceived sovereign waters with force, but instead only with diplomacy. While the parties have already signed up to this in principle in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, the new hub would help make this work by providing an opportunity for the relevant countries to monitor and respond to each incident in real time and to immediately negotiate de-escalation.

Third, the countries must agree to apply the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea to all vessels. The CUES, a 2014 agreement whose 21 signatories include all the relevant South China Sea parties, establishes guidelines for preventing incidents between navies and avoiding escalation when incidents occur. It’s a step forward that would go much further if applied to the more incident-prone Coast Guard and fishing vessels.

Fourth, the countries must construct a mechanism for adjudicating these incidents, for deciding how to proceed once an incident has occurred. Most effective would be a new mechanism comprised of and administered by representatives from the five claimant countries. The mechanism might be based at the maritime domain awareness hub, where real-time information could allow much quicker decisions to determine a way forward.

### 2AC - Say No

#### No one will say yes – fierce nationalism and territorial disputes.

Kaplan 2-6 - Robert Kaplan, South China Sea author and expert and author for Business Insider, 2-6-16(“The South China Sea will be the Battleground of the Future,” Business Insider, <http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-south-china-sea-is-so-crucial-2015-2>, Accessed 7-1-16, AJ)

In the interim, the South China Sea has become an armed camp, even as the scramble for reefs is mostly over. China has confiscated twelve geographical features, Taiwan one, the Vietnamese twenty- one, the Malaysians five, and the Philippines nine. In other words, facts have already been created on the ground.

Perhaps there can still be sharing arrangements for the oil and natural gas fields. But here it is unclear what, for instance, countries with contentious claims coupled with especially tense diplomatic relations like Vietnam and China will agree upon.

Take the Spratlys, with significant oil and natural gas deposits, which are claimed in full by China, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and in part by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. China has built concrete helipads and military structures on seven reefs and shoals.

On Mischief Reef, which China occupied under the nose of the Philippine navy in the 1990s, China has constructed a three-story building and five octagonal concrete structures, all for military use.

On Johnson Reef, China put up a structure armed with high-powered machine guns. Taiwan occupies Itu Aba Island, on which it has constructed dozens of buildings for military use, protected by hundreds of troops and twenty coastal guns.

Vietnam occupies twenty-one islands on which it has built runways, piers, barracks, storage tanks, and gun emplacements. Malaysia and the Philippines, as stated, have five and nine sites respectively, occupied by naval detachments.

Anyone who speculates that with globalization, territorial boundaries and fights for territory have lost their meaning should behold the South China Sea.

#### MDA fails – intelligence is perceived as military modernization – their author

Jackson et. Al. 16 – Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS and Associate Professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Senior Fellow with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. She is formerly a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, Paul Scharre, Senior Fellow and Director of the 20YY Future of Warfare Initiative at CNAS, Harry Krejsa, Research Associate with the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS, Jeff Chism, Commander in the U.S. Navy, March 2016(“Networked Transparency: Constructing a Common Operational Picture of the South China Sea,” Center for a New American Security, <http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS%20Report-COP-160331.pdf>, Accessed 6/30/16, AJ)

Southeast Asian countries are eager to acquire MDA capabilities for their own security needs close to their shores but are not necessarily convinced of the utility of sharing this information with their neighbors to create a common picture of the South China Sea. This hesitation, which risks MDA efforts being seen as yet another destabilizing example of military modernization, has at least two sources. First, regional states have deep concerns about sharing information with their neighbors, including those with whom they have positive relations. Second, Southeast Asian countries have hesitations about the political ends toward which a common operating picture may be directed. If policymakers are to implement a truly collaborative MDA system in the region, they must understand and surmount both obstacles.

The first of these political hurdles is not unique to Southeast Asia. Sensitive intelligence- and information-sharing can be a challenge even among long-standing allies – after 60 years of close ties, the United States and Japan are still working to improve their intelligence-sharing. In Southeast Asia, the Philippines and Thailand have formal treaties with the United States, but these states do not have close defense ties to each other. Regional trends have encouraged new alignments, including a new partnership between the Philippines and Vietnam, but this is only a first step toward deeper defense cooperation. Even as regional states increase the frequency and nature of their military interactions, they may hesitate to share sensitive maritime information. Intelligence-sharing has a unique ability to reveal state weaknesses as well as strengths.

A second, less common political hurdle also presents itself in Southeast Asia. Regional states have complex security and economic relationships with China, and therefore to the political goals that a South China Sea common operating picture would serve. As negative trends in the South China Sea have accelerated, U.S. policymakers have searched for ways to support regional partners and are themselves increasingly interested in providing countries with MDA capabilities. Improved maritime domain awareness can give partners the ability to monitor events at sea, deter and dissuade gray-zone coercion, and may even engender deeper regional understandings if maritime information-sharing begets broader patterns of cooperation. These capabilities are appropriate for engaging all manner of regional threats and challenges. The United States’ interest in supporting them, however, has an added, if unspoken, motivation: MDA can help partners deter and defend their own interests against a rising China.

# East China Sea

## Yes Conflict

### Great power war

#### China will initiate conflict – decimates US-Japan relations

White, 14

Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Few people believe that either China or Japan would deliberately start a war in the East China Sea. Most analysts assume that an armed clash could only occur through accident, misunderstanding or unauthorized acts by junior officers acting without, or even against, orders. These are not remote possibilities, of course. They already make the risk of war dangerously high. But we underestimate how high that risk really is if we think this is the only way a war could begin. I think there is a real possibility that fighting might be started deliberately by one side or the other, and unless we understand the circumstances that might prompt that step from either side, we will not be able to take steps to avoid them. First, we must be clear that neither side is at all likely to deliberately start a fight over possession of the disputed islands themselves, or even of the resources that might lie around them. They are not worth a military conflict to anyone. But the dispute has never been about territory. The islands are simply tokens in a contest to define the roles and status of Asia’s great powers over coming decades. These are issues over which states might well choose to start a war. Let’s start with China. As I have argued elsewhere, China’s primary aim is to strengthen its leadership in Asia and undermine America’s. The best way to do that without confronting America too directly is to weaken the alliances and partnerships that underpin U.S. regional leadership. It therefore wants to persuade U.S. allies that Washington is no longer willing to stand up for them against the growing power of China. (Whether Beijing would be right to assume that without U.S. support they would more willingly accept Chinese leadership is a separate question, of course. As far as Japan is concerned, I think they are probably wrong, but that is a separate issue.) Beijing has clearly decided that the Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute provides a perfect opportunity to demonstrate America’s wavering commitment to its allies. So far, they seem to have been right. China’s threatening military actions around the islands have stoked Japanese anxieties about whether, in the event of a clash, America would provide military support. Washington has done exactly as Beijing hoped, by sending distinctly mixed messages about what it might do in a crisis. This has indeed undermined Japanese confidence in the alliance. The risk here is that China might decide to take this approach one step further. Clearly, all of Japan’s fears would be realized, and the U.S.-Japanese alliance would be dealt a much more serious blow if a clash actually occurred around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and America did indeed fail to come to Japan’s aid. There must be a big temptation for Beijing to put America’s position in Asia to this much sterner test, in the hope that it will crack. Of course, that would only be a temptation if Beijing was very confident that Washington would indeed let Japan down. I think Beijing probably is quite confident of that, because they assume that Washington recognizes that America could not win an East China Sea conflict, and would be deterred from starting one for fear that it would escalate toward a nuclear exchange (I have explained this reasoning here). But Beijing must know that a really determined U.S. president might have the nerve to stare them down anyway. That gives Beijing a motive to move sooner rather than later in testing U.S. resolve. They have a motive to bring on a clash with Japan—perhaps by deliberately staging an “accidental” exchange of fire—while there is someone in the White House who they think will not have that kind of nerve. Someone like President Obama. Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder—or more reckless. If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash.

#### Japan could unilaterally escalate

White, 14

Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

What about Japan? Is there any risk that Tokyo might decide deliberately to start an armed clash with China? On the face of it this seems a much less likely possibility, but it cannot be dismissed completely. Japan’s leaders might decide that their interests would be served by bringing on a clash and settling the question of U.S. commitment to Japan’s security once and for all. They could well think that time is not on their side. After all, if they are worried today that America might not be willing to confront China on their behalf, how much less confident can they be about what would happen if they clashed with China five or ten years from now? That might lead them to think that it would be better to bring a conflict on now, hoping that Washington would step forward with a robust military response which would force China to back off and drop its challenge to U.S. leadership in Asia, while restoring Japanese confidence in America’s security guarantees. Students of history will see some echoes here of the thinking which brought Japan to Pearl Harbour in 1941. Of course, Japan’s leaders would recognize the real possibility that America would fail a test of its commitment. But they might think Japan would be better off knowing now that America will not protect them from China, rather than remaining uncertain. It is not hard to imagine Japanese leaders like Shinzo Abe concluding that if Japan must in the future stand on its own against China without U.S. support, the sooner this becomes clear, the better. And the sooner Japan can start to take the necessary steps to defend itself independently, the better.

#### Goes nuclear – China’s young leadership never lived through the cold war and take nuke escalation lightly.

White, 14

Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2>, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

At the top of this ladder of escalation looms the possibility of an intercontinental nuclear exchange, which would, or at least should, weigh heavily on both side’s calculations right from the start. During the Cold War, the possibility of a large-scale nuclear exchange affected the calculations of the superpowers whenever there was a risk of even the smallest-scale skirmishes between their forces. That was because each superpower recognized how hard it would be to contain an escalating conflict before it reached the nuclear level, because they both saw the danger that neither of them would back down and accept defeat even to avoid a nuclear exchange. War was avoided because both sides understood that their opponents were as grimly resolved as they were.

#### Tensions go nuclear – it’s a question of resolve and China wins.

White, 14

Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2>, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

Can we say the same of America and China today? There has perhaps been a tendency among American strategists to overlook the importance of the nuclear dimension of any US-China conflict. They underestimate the significance of China’s nuclear forces because they are so much smaller than the Soviet’s were during the Cold War, or than America’s are today. But that does not make negligible. They can still destroy American cities, and kill millions of Americans, and it would be a desperate gamble to try to destroy them with a disarming first strike. That means we have to pay a lot of attention to the question of China’s resolve. China of course faces huge risks from America’s much greater forces, but its strategists may well calculate that on balance the nuclear factor favors China, because it plays to what they may see as China’s decisive advantage over the US in an East China Sea scenario: the balance of resolve. Let me explain. When two adversaries are relatively evenly balanced in their ability to hurt one another, the advantages lies with the one with greater resolve. More precisely, in the contest of wills that drives any escalating conflict, the advantage lies with the side that can persuade its opponent that it has the greater resolve, and will thus not step back and accept defeat before the escalating conflict has cost the other side more than it is willing to pay. If one side is confident that the other believes it has more resolve, that side will be confident that the other will back off first, and will thus be more willing to enter a conflict, and more willing to escalate it. If the operational balance is as I have suggested here, then this is the situation Washington would face in a conflict with China in support of Japan over the Senkakus. The outcome would depend on the balance of resolve. It would only be wise for America to enter a conflict with China if Washington was confident both that Beijing was less resolved to win than they were, and that Beijing understood this. Only then could Washington be confident that Beijing would accept defeat before the conflict had escalated right out of control, and cost America more than the objectives at stake were worth. So which side has the greater resolve? Is America more committed to preserving the primacy it has enjoyed in Asia for over a century than China is to restore the primacy it enjoyed for centuries before that? I think the answer is probably no. We cannot assume that China is any less determined to change the Asian order than America is to preserve it. Nor can we simply assume that China’s leaders would be too nervous about domestic stability in China to allow a conflict with the US to escalate. On the contrary, public option might well stop Beijing from retreating just as much as US opinion would stop Washington – and probably more so. Ultimately it is a simple question of geography. What happens in Asia, and the waters around Asia, really matters to China, just the way what happens in the Caribbean really matters to America. If we assume that America cares more about the Caribbean than China, we should equally accept that China cares more about the Western Pacific that America. And most importantly, this is probably the way China sees the balance of resolve. That makes China a very dangerous adversary.

### Escalation now

#### China has been steadily escalating for the last year – one more aggressive move could draw in the US.

CFR, 6/29

Council on Foreign Relations, 2016 (“Tensions in the East China Sea,” *Conflict Tracker,* Center for Preventative Action (CPA), June 29th, 2016, Available Online at: <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea>, Accessed 6/29/16, DSF)

In June 2015, the Japanese government revealed that China came closer to Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by establishing natural gas projects along the border between the two countries. Chinese and Japanese naval and air patrol vessels continue to operate closely in the area, making the risk of a miscalculation that could lead to an armed confrontation a real danger. To maintain its strategic advantage, China has converted naval warships of considerable size and capability to coast guard vessels, These actions, as well as Chinese coast guards’ constant patrolling, present serious concerns for Japan. In 2015, Chinese aircrafts approached Japan’s airspace more than 570 times, causing the Japanese government to scramble in response. There has been a sharp increase in the number of jet fighter scrambles in the past year; Japan’s air force recorded a 16 percent increase in airspace incursions, which represents the second highest number of interactions since the 1980s. Aside from a brief period after World War II when the United States controlled the territory, the Senkaku/Daioyu islands have formally been a part of Japanese territory since 1895, although owned by a private Japanese citizen. China began to assert claims over the Senkaku/Daioyu islands in the 1970s. Tensions resurfaced in September 2012 when Japan purchased three of the disputed islands from the private owner. The economically significant islands, which are northeast of Taiwan, have potential oil and natural gas reserves, are near prominent shipping routes, and are surrounded by rich fishing areas. Each country claims to have economic rights in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of two hundred nautical miles, but that space overlaps because the sea only spans three hundred and sixty nautical miles. After China discovered natural gas near the overlapping EEZ-claimed area in 1995, Japan objected to any drilling in the area due to the fact that the oil reserve could be connected to a field that spans into the disputed zone. In April 2014, President Barack Obama became the first U.S. president to explicitly state that the disputed islands are covered by the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, although the United States takes no formal position on their ultimate sovereignty. An accidental military incident or political miscalculation by China or Japan could embroil the United States in armed hostilities with China.

#### Bilateral discussions between Japan and China have been going on since 2012 – but tensions have still escalated. US action Key.

CFR, 6/29

Council on Foreign Relations, 2016 (“Tensions in the East China Sea,” *Conflict Tracker,* Center for Preventative Action (CPA), June 29th, 2016, Available Online at: <http://www.cfr.org/global/global-conflict-tracker/p32137#!/conflict/tensions-in-the-east-china-sea>, Accessed 6/29/16, DSF)

Discussions between Japan and China to develop a crisis management mechanism tool began in 2012. Talks stalled when tensions peaked in 2013 after China declared the establishment of an Air Defense Identification Zone. After Japan and China signed a four-point consensus document laying out their differences concerning the disputed islands, bilateral discussions resumed in fall 2014, bilateral discussions resumed in early 2015, aiming to implement the maritime and aerial communication mechanism. Rising nationalist sentiments and growing political mistrust heighten the potential for conflict and hinders the capacity for peaceful resolution of the dispute. Though Chinese and Japanese leaders have refrained from forcibly establishing control over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, unauthorized action by local commanders could result in the unintended escalation of hostilities. Through treaty commitments with Japan, a military confrontation could involve the United States. To preserve relations with China and continue cooperation on various issues, the United States has an interest in de-escalating tensions.

### Miscalc

#### ECS has high potential for miscalc – civilians & human error

Smith, 13

Sheila A., an expert on Japanese politics and foreign policy, is senior fellow for Japan studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Vice chair of the U.S. advisors to the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Exchange (CULCON), a bi-national advisory panel of government officials and private sector members. She teaches as an adjunct professor at the Asian Studies Department of Georgetown University and serves on the board of its Journal of Asian Affairs. She earned her MA and PhD degrees from the department of political science at Columbia University, 2013 (“A Sino-Japanese Clash in the East China Sea: Contingency Planning Memorancum No. 18,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, April 2013, Accessible Online at: <http://www.cfr.org/japan/sino-japanese-clash-east-china-sea/p30504>, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

Although recent incidents have sensitized China and Japan to the risk of accidental and unintended military interactions, the danger will persist while emotions run high and their forces operate in close proximity. In stressful and ambiguous times, when decision-making is compressed by the speed of modern weapons systems, the risk of human error is higher. The 2001 collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter jet near Hainan Island is a case in point, as was the intrusion of a Chinese Han submarine in Japanese territorial waters in 2004. So-called rules of engagement (ROEs), intended to guide and control the behavior of local actors, are typically general in scope and leave room for personal interpretation that may lead to actions that escalate a crisis situation. Compounding the risk of unintended escalation between Chinese and Japanese air and naval units is the unpredictable involvement of third parties such as fishermen or civilian activists who may attempt to land on the islands. Their actions could precipitate an armed response by either side.

### Solvency

#### US action in Asia k2 stability

Akaha, 14

Tsuneo, Professor of International Policy Studies and Director of the Center for East Asian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, California, 2014 (“Reducing Tensions in East Asia,” The Diplomat, April 28, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/reducing-tensions-in-east-asia/>., Accessed: 6/30/2016, DSF)

Regional tensions and security threats, including the nuclear and missile development in North Korea, the territorial disputes in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Sea of Japan/East Sea are unlikely to disappear any time soon. To avoid potentially destructive consequences, Northeast Asian countries and their Southeast Asian counterparts must build a more effective mechanism for multilateral security cooperation that goes beyond the ASEAN-centered framework. Sadly, the prospects of such a framework emerging in the foreseeable future are rather remote. In the meantime, the U.S.-centric hub-and-spokes system will play an important role in keeping peace and stability in the region. Of course this will frustrate the efforts of some of the regional political leaders to reduce the presence and influence of the United States, but until Japan, China, Korea, Russia, and the United States can find a mutually acceptable framework to address their grievances and conflicting interests, the ASEAN- and U.S.-centered systems need to complement each other in preventing regional tension from reaching the threshold of hostilities. At the same time, the regional powers need to make further progress on economic cooperation, including the establishment of bilateral and multilateral trade and investment regimes to accelerate the process of economic integration. There is no question that such efforts will require mutual accommodation between Japan and its regional neighbors.

## No Conflict

### Squo

#### Squo solves possible ECS conflict

CFR, 16

Council on Foreign Relations, 2016 (“China’s Maritime Disputes,” CFR, February 2016, Accessible Online at: <http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/chinas-maritime-disputes/p31345#!/>, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

If confrontation were to involve Japan in the East China Sea or the Philippines in the South China Sea, the United States would be obligated to consider military action under defense treaties. Experts note that Washington's defense commitments to Tokyo are stronger than those to Manila. Under its treaty obligations, the United States would have to defend Japan in the case of an armed attack; the U.S.-Philippine treaty holds both nations accountable for mutual support in the event of an “armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties.” Military action would represent a last resort, and would depend on the scale and circumstances of the escalation. In the event of armed conflict breaking out between China and Japan, the United States could also use crisis communication mechanisms outlined in the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (PDF) to encourage a stand-down of forces and facilitate communication between Tokyo and Beijing. Verbal declarations that communicate the seriousness of the dispute and convey support for an ally, as well as offers of military assistance, can also serve as essential “coercive de-escalation” measures during a crisis.

### Congress Blocks

#### Congress blocks quick executive action – means the US doesn’t get drawn in.

Sracic, 14

Paul, professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Youngstown State University in Ohio, where he also directs the Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center, 2014 (“Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/will-the-u-s-really-defend-japan/., Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

At the same time China has been cleverly taking actions, such as setting up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in area, which might call into question Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku. So far, this has not altered the position of the Obama administration. Nor has it influenced Congress, which added a resolution to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act stating “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” This latter resolution is significant because, in the end, Congress may be the most important, and most vulnerable, institution when it comes to defending Japan. To understand why, it is helpful to look at the actual text of the U.S.-Japan treaty According to Article 5 of the treaty, each country is obligated “to meet common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes” (my emphasis). Lest one think that that this language was intended only to acknowledge Japan’s constitutional restrictions, a similar reference to constitutional demands is common in joint security arrangements entered into by the U.S. It is found, for example, in the NATO and SEATO treaties. According to the Congressional Research Service, the language was intended “to satisfy congressional concerns that the agreements could be interpreted as sanctioning the President to take military action in defense of treaty parties without additional congressional authorization.” This understanding is confirmed by 1973 The War Powers Resolution, which specifically states that presidential authority to unilaterally send troops into harm’s way shall not be inferred “from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.” There is, of course, an ongoing legal controversy in the U.S. over the extent of war powers given to the president as commander and chief of the military. Obama’s position on this matter is far from clear. In response to a question from the Boston Globe back in 2008, candidate Obama explained “the President does not have power under the Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation.” In Libya in 2011, however, President Obama acted very differently, using American airpower to enforce a no-fly zone without seeking Congressional authorization. In Syria in 2013, however, the President refused to act without first consulting with the Congress. David Rothkopf wrote in Foreign Policy magazine that by going to Congress Obama had now made it “highly unlikely that at any time during the remainder of his term will he be able to initiate military action without seeking congressional approval.” If this is correct, then in the event of a battle in the East China Sea, Obama’s first reaction may not be to provide immediate military assistance. Instead, the president will request an authorization from Congress. Will this authorization be forthcoming? Based on the prior resolution, the answer appears to be yes. It is useful to recall that, at first, it seemed likely that Congress would support Obama’s call to use force in Syria. After all, both Obama and Republican House Speaker John Boehner supported this action. It was only after Congress and the public began paying attention to what was actually happening in Syria that it became clear that the votes were not there. Of course one cannot directly compare Syria and Japan. In Syria, the U.S. was not sure whether it had friends on either side of the conflict. More importantly, no treaty obligations were involved. Still, as it was with in Syria, the U.S. public knows very little about the islands that are the subject of so much debate between Japan and China. In the event that open hostilities break out over the islands, this will quickly change. How will constituent phone calls and e-mails trend when voters learn that the U.S. government’s position is that it takes no position on which country has the more valid claim to the islands? Will the public support risking World War III (that is undoubtedly how it will be portrayed by those opposing action) to defend territory whose ultimate owner, according to the U.S. government, is in dispute?

### Miscalc

#### No war - ECS miscalc empirically disproven

Stashwick, 15

Steven, 2015 (“South China Sea: Conflict Escalation and ‘Miscalculation’ Myths,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2015, Accessible Online at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/south-china-sea-conflict-escalation-and-miscalculation-myths/>, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

The threat of “miscalculation” is again in vogue. What was once a preoccupation of accidental war theorists has resurfaced in discussions about maritime disputes in Southeast Asia and Sino-U.S. relations. During the Cold War, policymakers and scholars worried about nuclear annihilation sparked by misinterpreted warnings, rogue officers, technical glitches in command and control systems, or a lower-level confrontation spiraling out of control. Absent the Cold War’s looming nuclear threat, today’s oft-repeated concerns focus on “miscalculation” causing a local or tactical-level incident between individual ships or aircraft (harassment, collision, interdiction, and so on) to lead to broader military confrontation. Some variation of this theme has been featured in public remarks by former U.S. Defense Secretaries Gates, Panetta, Hagel, and current Defense Secretary Carter, as well as Commanders of the U.S. Pacific Fleet and the U.S. Pacific Command, and was a topic of policymaker discussion going back at least to the 1996 Taiwan Strait incident. These concerns are likewise found in too many op-eds, reports, interviews, commentaries, and articles to count (see also here, here, here, and here, etc.) However, while history shows that strategic miscalculations can lead states to war, or dangerously close to it, evidence does not support the worry that miscalculation may cause a local or tactical-level incident to spiral out of control. To understand the risks associated with miscalculation, we must distinguish between miscalculation at the strategic level and miscalculation stemming from a localized incident between naval or air forces. At the strategic level – that is, a nation’s a priori willingness to escalate a conflict and use military force to achieve its objectives – no country starts a war expecting to lose. Yet, “most wars…end in the defeat of at least one nation which had expected victory,” implying all wars result from some degree of strategic miscalculation. That may be a plausible danger in Southeast Asia, but a distinct one. Instead, much of the discourse about localized maritime incidents in the South China Sea conflates strategic and local miscalculation risks, focusing on the latter’s potential to lead to a wider conflict. This concern over local miscalculation nonetheless reflects a longstanding view of the danger “incidents at sea” poses to peace stretching back to the Cold War. Both U.S. and Soviet leaderships were concerned that an incident between “peppery young ship captains” could “lead people to shoot at each other with results that might…be impossible to control,” in the words of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, U.S. Chief of Naval Operations in the 1970s. Back then, the U.S. and Soviets were openly adversarial and serious incidents between their ships and aircraft were almost commonplace. Yet despite explicit mutual, strategic, and existential antagonism between the U.S. and U.S.SR, none of the hundreds of maritime incidents that occurred over the four decades of the Cold War escalated into anything beyond a short diplomatic crisis. It is possible that they avoided a nuclear spiral in these incidents through diligent diplomacy and luck. But more likely, it suggests that this type of maritime incident is insufficient on its own to lead to the worst-case scenarios envisioned. Mitigating the miscalculation concerns of officials and the extreme scenarios of some commentators is that these maritime incidents do not occur in a vacuum, de-coupled from explicit national interests. In a famous 1988 Cold War incident, Soviet vessels in the Black Sea shouldered the U.S. warships Yorktown and Caron (a controlled collision meant to push a ship off-course) while the latter were deliberately contesting what the U.S. deemed excessive Soviet legal claims over maritime rights. The Soviets knew the U.S. vessels were there to intentionally flout their claims, and the U.S. knew the Soviets would likely try to enforce them. Even if the firmness of the Soviet response was unanticipated (or deemed unlikely), there was no mystery to either side’s objectives. Thus, neither side was going to start shooting in confusion; the Soviet vessels even radioed their intention to strike the U.S. ships. While not “safe” in the strictest sense (ships do not like to “swap paint” with each other), footage from the Yorktown and Caron being pushed shows the actions to be intense but deliberate, professionally executed, and clearly of an enforcement nature, rather than a prelude to combat. While a serious diplomatic incident, both sides understood the situation, which served to moderate concern over escalation. Similarly, a shouldering incident between the U.S. cruiser Cowpens and a Chinese warship in 2013, while concerning to the U.S. from a safety-at-sea perspective, was understood to be motivated by Chinese sensitivities around testing their new aircraft carrier, not a precursor to hostilities.

#### No impact to ECS miscalc

Sieg, 12

Linda, ,2012 (“Japan, China military conflict seen unlikely despite strain,” REUTERS, September 23, 2012, Accssible Online at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-japan-confrontation-idUSBRE88M0F220120923>, Accessed on 6/30/16, DSF)

Hawkish Chinese commentators have urged Beijing to prepare for military conflict with Japan as tensions mount over disputed islands in the East China Sea, but most experts say chances the Asian rivals will decide to go to war are slim. A bigger risk is the possibility that an unintended maritime clash results in deaths and boosts pressure for retaliation, but even then Tokyo and Beijing are expected to seek to manage the row before it becomes a full-blown military confrontation. "That's the real risk - a maritime incident leading to a loss of life. If a Japanese or Chinese were killed, there would be a huge outpouring of nationalist sentiment," said Linda Jakobson, director of the East Asia Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. "But I still cannot seriously imagine it would lead to an attack on the other country. I do think rational minds would prevail," she said, adding economic retaliation was more likely. A feud over the lonely islets in the East China Sea flared this month after Japan's government bought three of the islands from a private owner, triggering violent protests in China and threatening business between Asia's two biggest economies. Adding to the tensions, China sent more than 10 government patrol vessels to waters near the islands, known as the Diaoyu in China and the Senkaku in Japan, while Japan beefed up its Coast Guard patrols. Chinese media said 1,000 fishing boats have set sail for the area, although none has been sighted close by. Despite the diplomatic standoff and rising nationalist sentiment in China especially, experts agree neither Beijing nor Tokyo would intentionally escalate to a military confrontation what is already the worst crisis in bilateral ties in decades.

### Economics

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Byrnes, 15

Sholto, senior fellow at the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, 2015 (“Forget the doomsayers, a US-China conflict is unlikely,” The National Opinion, Septermber 8th, 2015, Accessible online at: <http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/forget-the-doomsayers-a-us-china-conflict-is-unlikely#full>, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

Unintended incidents are certainly possible with both the US and China increasing their armed forces in the region. Despite the predictions of hawkish doomsayers, however, the prospect of armed conflict between the two powers seems unlikely – not least as it is most certainly not in the interests of two countries that now have a trading relationship worth over $550 billion per year. But this is just as much because, as the US defence department paper puts it: “China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict.” Having read the paper in full, there is nothing in it that suggests the US could definitively put a stop to this “salami-slicing” approach. In the South China Sea, at least, there are no red lines.

### US public

#### No US-Sino war – US public and chinese leadership

Desker, 15

Barry, Distinguished Fellow and Bakrie Professor of South-east Asia Policy, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2015 (“War unlikely even as US, China test waters in contested seas,” The Straits Times, October 31, 2015, Accessible online at: <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/war-unlikely-even-as-us-china-test-waters-in-contested-seas>, Accessed 6/30/16, DSF)

However, as major powers, the US and China will focus on the management of their differences. Already, on Thursday, the US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral John Richardson, had a video conference with the Chief of the Chinese Navy, Admiral Wu Shengli. Although Adm Wu told Adm Richardson that there is a risk of "a minor incident that sparks war", significantly, both sides agreed to maintain the dialogue and to follow agreed protocols to prevent clashes. Scheduled port visits by US and Chinese ships and planned visits to China by senior US Navy officers remain on track. Regional claimant states hoping for a strong American response should bear in mind that it will be difficult to convince a weary American public to embark on another major overseas conflict. This factor, together with China's interest in avoiding war so that its leadership can continue to focus on economic development, make it unlikely that China and the US will miscalculate and head blindly into war. My assessment is contrary to the view of those scholars and policymakers who believe in the considerable risk of war as China, the rising power, challenges the dominance of the US, the global superpower.

## Defend the Law CP

### 1NC – ECS

#### Text: The United States federal government should make a public announcement of commitment to a full-scale war in response to Chinese escalation against Japan and should coerce China and Japan to refer the case to an international court.

#### CP leads to China backing down, solves ECS conflict

Xu, 13

Shirley, Contributing Writer at Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, 2013 (“STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE,” Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, October 15, 2013, Accessible online at: <https://prospectjournal.org/2013/10/15/strategic-responses-to-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute/>, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

If tension between China and Japan continues to escalate over sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, the United States is obligated to support Japan in the event of armed conflict due to the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty. War against China is a highly unfavorable outcome for the United States; however, repeated public statements by U.S. officials, including then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, have indicated firm recognition of Japanese administration of the islands, as well as reassurance that the United States will honor the treaty in the event of direct Chinese aggression. This could very well draw the United States into a regional conflict between China and Japan. Analysis of current and past diplomatic situations between China, Japan and the United States, along with existing strategies taken in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands dispute reveal a common aversion to war despite repeated escalation and aggressive signaling by China. Due to thriving Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese economic ties, as well as recent efforts by the United States to create strong defense and development alliances in the Asia-Pacific region, it is in the best interest of all parties involved for Japan and China to seek a peaceful resolution of the dispute. While the United States has historically remained neutral regarding sovereignty of the islands, it plays an essential role in preventing the possible outbreak of war between China and Japan. Three potential strategies for the United States to avert fighting come to mind: 1. Appeasement of China with weak signaling and persuasion of Japan to relinquish claims. 2. Adherence to the defense treaty with Japan, no direct militarization of U.S. forces and public militarization of Japanese forces to form a trip-wire defense. 3. Adherence to the defense treaty with Japan, public announcement of commitment to a full-scale war in response to escalation and coercion of Japan and China to refer the case to an international court. Despite its potential for extreme escalation, the third strategy is proposed as the ideal strategy due to its resolute execution, high stakes and greater probability of quickly reaching a peaceful consensus.

### 2NC - Solvency

#### The CP establishes US credibility – k2 deter China escalation

White, 14

Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder—or more reckless. If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash.

#### Obama tried taking the diplomatic middle ground – but conflict has only escalated

McCurry & Branigan, 14

Justin & Tania, Tokyo and China correspondents for the Guardian, 2014 (“Obama says US will defend Japan in island dispute with China,” The Guardian, April 24th, 2014, Accessible online at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/24/obama-in-japan-backs-status-quo-in-island-dispute-with-china>, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

The US is duty-bound to come to Japan’s aid in the event of a conflict with China over a group of disputed islands in the East China Sea, Barack Obama declared at the start of a tour of Asia aimed at reassuring Washington’s allies in the face of threats to stability from North Korea and an increasingly assertive China. Obama went further than some analysts had expected in reassuring the Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, that Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkakus – known in China as the Diaoyu – were covered by the allies’ post-war security treaty. But he reiterated Washington’s refusal to take sides in the sovereignty dispute and called on China and Japan to resolve their differences through dialogue. “Our commitment to Japan’s security is absolute and article five [of the security treaty] covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands,” Obama said during a joint press conference with Abe. “We don’t take a position on final sovereignty on the Senkakus but historically they’ve been administered by Japan and should not be subject to change unilaterally. “My hope is that Chinese will continue to engage with the US and other countries. We don’t take a position on this piece of land or this piece of rock but we do take a position on the peaceful resolution of these disputes.”

#### The CP’s fiat breaks the balance – k2 US action on ECS

Sracic, 14

Paul, professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Youngstown State University in Ohio, where he also directs the Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center, 2014 (“Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/will-the-u-s-really-defend-japan/., Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

If the unthinkable happens, and the dispute in the East China Sea between Japan and China over the Senkaku islands (called the Diaoyu islands by the Chinese) escalates into a military conflict, will the U.S. military really come to the aid of Japan? This is certainly the implied position of the Obama administration, but would it be able to follow through on this commitment? If not, what impact will this have on future relations with Japan and in Asia? These are very important questions, yet no one is asking them; this is because no one thinks they need to be asked. On the surface, this is true. In late April 2014, President Obama twice stated that the disputed islands are, in his words, “administered by Japan and therefore fall within the scope of Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.” The president’s statement affirmed a position that had already been articulated by former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, current Secretary of State John Kerry, and former Defense Secretary Leon Panetta. It was, nevertheless, very well received in Japan, with one of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s advisors declaring it “the most reassuring statement that the nation has ever heard from the U.S.“ At the same time China has been cleverly taking actions, such as setting up an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in area, which might call into question Japan’s administrative control over the Senkaku. So far, this has not altered the position of the Obama administration. Nor has it influenced Congress, which added a resolution to the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act stating “the unilateral action of a third party will not affect the United States’ acknowledgment of the administration of Japan over the Senkaku Islands.” This latter resolution is significant because, in the end, Congress may be the most important, and most vulnerable, institution when it comes to defending Japan. To understand why, it is helpful to look at the actual text of the U.S.-Japan treaty According to Article 5 of the treaty, each country is obligated “to meet common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes” (my emphasis). Lest one think that that this language was intended only to acknowledge Japan’s constitutional restrictions, a similar reference to constitutional demands is common in joint security arrangements entered into by the U.S. It is found, for example, in the NATO and SEATO treaties. According to the Congressional Research Service, the language was intended “to satisfy congressional concerns that the agreements could be interpreted as sanctioning the President to take military action in defense of treaty parties without additional congressional authorization.” This understanding is confirmed by 1973 The War Powers Resolution, which specifically states that presidential authority to unilaterally send troops into harm’s way shall not be inferred “from any treaty heretofore or hereafter ratified unless such treaty is implemented by legislation specifically authorizing the introduction of United States Armed Forces into hostilities.”

#### Pre-emptive escalation solves

Xu, 13

Shirley, Contributing Writer at Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, 2013 (“STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE,” Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, October 15, 2013, Accessible online at: <https://prospectjournal.org/2013/10/15/strategic-responses-to-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute/>, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

Logically, war is the least favorable outcome for all parties. The United States cannot escalate against China and successfully achieve the ideal result of Japanese sovereignty of Senkaku at the same time without committing to an unrestricted war. While potential gains of spearheading the winning side of such a war are equally great, waging a devastating war is by no means the best option. However, due to a binding treaty that compels the United States to defend Japan, the United States has already repeatedly signaled in public to China its willingness to respond with escalation in the event of further Chinese provocation. By accumulating significant audience costs, the abandonment of the United States’ defense obligation to Japan is unlikely . Thus, if China escalates, the United States has no choice but to escalate as well. While escalation is the best response for the United States to Chinese provocation in the conflict, war is the least ideal conclusion because of the aforementioned potential for extreme escalation as well as the likely destruction of essential economic and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific. Rather than escalate for the sake of fighting a war, the United States should use escalation as a means to broker peace. For the United States, the islands at the center of the dispute offer little benefit. While the presence of oil in the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and surrounding seas has been a point of interest in this dispute, sources show an amount too insignificant to logically warrant such drama between Japan and China , let alone the intervention of the United States. While the Japanese and Chinese view the disputed territories as important, they do so through a symbolic lens centered on national pride. Although the United States must escalate to honor its treaty obligations, it will not use escalation as a catalyst for direct warfare, but rather for the prevention of it.

#### The risk is worth it – de-escalates conflicts in the long term

Xu, 13

Shirley, Contributing Writer at Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, 2013 (“STRATEGIC RESPONSES TO THE SENKAKU/DIAOYU ISLANDS DISPUTE,” Prospect Journal of International Affairs at USCD, October 15, 2013, Accessible online at: <https://prospectjournal.org/2013/10/15/strategic-responses-to-the-senkakudiaoyu-islands-dispute/>, Accessed on 6/29/16, DSF)

The Senkaku/Diaoyu disputes could potentially escalate into war. However, it is clear that war is not the preferred outcome for any of the parties involved. While the United States may be reluctant to intercede on behalf of Japan, it should not hesitate to oblige to its alliance when faced with the real possibility of armed conflict. By elevating the risks of escalation and preparing for full-scale war, the United States exhibits a credible commitment to its diplomatic alliance with Japan. This forces China to tone down its hawkish rhetoric and stifles any potential expansionist desires. In reality, this high-risk, high-commitment strategy is feasible due to the China’s aversion to a full-scale regional war with the United States. Japan will have no choice but to comply with negotiations of peace due to the United States’ conditions of non-interference in the event of a war initiated by Japan. Thus, risking an all out war is actually the most effective manner to directing all parties toward serious and productive discussion toward a peace treaty.

### 2NC – NB - PTX

#### The CP is a hardline approach to china – taking Japan’s side definitively in the conflict. Avoids our link to ptx which is premised on the plan being seen as a concession to china.

### 2NC - NB – Japan Rearm DA

Squo weakens US-Japan relations, CP k2 solve

Sracic, 14

Paul, professor and Chair of the Department of Politics and International Relations at Youngstown State University in Ohio, where he also directs the Rigelhaupt Pre-Law Center, 2014 (“Will the U.S. Really Defend Japan?,” The Diplomat, July 26, 2014, Accessible Online at: http://thediplomat.com/2014/07/will-the-u-s-really-defend-japan/., Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

These questions should be bothering not only Japan’s friends in Washington, but also her leaders in Nagatachō. The Obama administration’s persistent assurances about section 5 coverage, insofar as they ignore the role of Congress, may be providing Japan with a false sense of security. At the same time, the continued insistence that the U.S. is neutral with regard to sovereignty over the islands has provided China with a valuable argument that it can exploit to influence U.S. public opinion. It may well be that China’s ultimate goal is not only to possess the islands, but more importantly to weaken the relationship between the U.S. and Japan. In the end, Obama and his advisors need to remember two things. First, international relations is as much about anticipating threats as it is with dealing with problems as they emerge. Second, even in the area of international relations, Congress matters. This may nowhere be truer than in the East China Sea.

#### CP avoids the disad

Gertz, 15

Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party, 2015 (“Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” The Washington Free Beacon, Accessible Online at: <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

John Tkacik, a former China specialist with the State Department, said Obama’s statement was significant. The Senkakus have been a central concern of the U.S.-Japan alliance since the islands were handed over to Japan by the United States in 1972, he said. “Tokyo rightly considers the islands a touchstone of the alliance’s durability,” Tkacik said. “The tenor of President Obama’s reaffirmation of U.S. commitment to the alliance, and specifically the Senkakus, was at least as firm as past presidents, and actually may even be more explicit than any other president personally has given,” he added. “It’s an indication that President Obama appreciates the gravity of the strain China’s aggressiveness in the Okinawa area has placed on the alliance.”

## A2 Defend the Law CP

### 2AC - TL

#### CP already happened

Gertz, 15

Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party, 2015 (“Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” The Washington Free Beacon, Accessible Online at: <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

President Obama on Tuesday invoked U.S. military defense guarantees for Japan’s disputed East China Sea islands that have been the target of coordinated Chinese military provocations since 2012. During a Rose Garden press conference with visiting Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Obama repeated a promise to defend the Senkaku Islands, a statement that is likely to anger China, which claims the uninhabited islands as its own, calling them the Diaoyu Islands. “I want to reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and that Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including Senkaku Islands,” Obama said in a carefully crafted statement.

#### Japan DA isn’t a NB – the CP causes more china aggression

Gertz, 15

Bill, senior editor of the Washington Free Beacon. Prior to joining the Beacon he was a national security reporter, editor, and columnist for 27 years at the Washington Times. Bill is the author of six books, four of which were national bestsellers. His most recent book was The Failure Factory, a look at an out-of-control government bureaucracy that could have been a primer for the Tea Party, 2015 (“Obama Says U.S. Will Defend Japan’s Senkakus,” The Washington Free Beacon, Accessible Online at: <http://freebeacon.com/national-security/obama-says-u-s-will-defend-japans-senkakus/>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

The announcement also comes amid revised U.S.-Japan defense guidelines that analysts say are designed to counter China’s regional aggression. The treaty article mentioned by the president is part of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. It states that an armed attack on either country would prompt action “to meet the common danger.” Other lower-level U.S. officials have made the commitment in the past. But it was the second time in two years that Obama mentioned the military commitment, giving it more political weight. Chinese Embassy spokesman Zhu Haiquan said the Diaoyu island and its affiliated islands “are China’s inherent territory.” “No matter what others say or do, the fact that the Diaoyu islands belong to China cannot be changed, and the determination and will of the Chinese government and people to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity will not be shaken,” he said. Zhu said the U.S.-Japan alliance was forged during the Cold War. “We are firmly opposed to making use of this alliance against the interests of a third party including China,” he said. “We urge the U.S. side to be discreet with what it says and does, honor its commitment of not taking sides on issues concerning territorial sovereignty, and do more to promote regional peace and stability, instead of the other way around.”

Empirics flow aff – China thinks it’s a bluff

White, 14

Hugh, is professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“A Great War in the East China Sea: Why China and Japan Could Fight,” The National Interest, July 15, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/great-war-the-east-china-sea-why-china-japan-could-fight-10877>, Accessed on 7/1/16, DSF)

Obama’s reluctance to engage in Libya, Syria, Ukraine and Iraq and the evident ambivalence about the much-hyped “pivot” to Asia may encourage Beijing to think that Obama’s presidency offers them a window of opportunity that will close after the next election if the new president is bolder—or more reckless. If so, China’s leaders might be tempted to stage an incident against Japan while Obama is still in the White House. The obvious way to reduce this risk is for the president to state clearly that America would support Japan militarily in any clash over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which is exactly what Obama said in Tokyo in late April. If a statement like this carries real credibility, it should deter Beijing from starting a clash. But if not—if it looks like a bluff or a rash statement made without careful consideration of what a war with China might mean—then China might expect that Obama would back down if put to the test. That could then actually encourage China to stage a clash. We can see why if we look back half a century. Shortly before the crisis broke in October 1962, Kennedy had publicly promised to prevent Moscow from deploying missiles to Cuba. Recent scholarship suggests that Khrushchev saw this as an opportunity to score an easy win over his younger and less experienced adversary. He believed Kennedy would not risk war to back up his promise, because Khrushchev did not believe that Soviet missiles in Cuba would materially affect U.S. security, and he didn’t believe Kennedy would think they would either. He therefore decided to call Kennedy’s bluff, make him back down, and gain a psychological and political advantage. That was why he sent the missiles to Cuba. In the event, of course, Kennedy turned out to be tougher—or more reckless—than Khrushchev had expected, and Khrushchev suffered the consequences. However, there is a risk that Beijing might respond—as Khrushchev did to Kennedy—to Obama’s less-than-credible affirmation of U.S. support to Japan, seeing it as an opportunity to call his bluff and damage his, and America’s, credibility in Asia. The more Obama commits himself to support Japan, the worse it will look for America, and the better it will look for China, if he doesn’t. This suggests that Obama should be very wary about bold affirmations of commitment to defend Japan, unless he can be sure that China will believe them. The best and perhaps only way to do that is to persuade Beijing that their assumptions about how such a war would go are wrong. He needs to convince Beijing that America does indeed have credible military options to defeat China in an East China Sea conflict. To do that he needs to do more than just boast about America’s unmatched military power, because Beijing does not buy that line anymore. He needs to look carefully at how exactly America could prevail over China militarily. If, having done that, he believes there is a workable military option, he needs to say enough about it publicly to convince the Chinese of that. If not, of course, then he needs to rethink his whole strategy in Asia.

#### Hardline stance is the wrong approach – CP triggers nuke war.

White, 14

Hugh, professor of strategic studies at the Australian National University in Canberra. His book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power was published in the US last year by Oxford University Press. , 2014 (“Asia's Nightmare Scenario: A War in the East China Sea Over the Senkakus,” The National Interest, July 5, 2014, Accessible Online at: <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/asias-nightmare-scenario-war-the-east-china-sea-over-the-10805?page=2>, Accessed 7/1/16, DSF)

Can we say the same of America and China today? There has perhaps been a tendency among American strategists to overlook the importance of the nuclear dimension of any US-China conflict. They underestimate the significance of China’s nuclear forces because they are so much smaller than the Soviet’s were during the Cold War, or than America’s are today. But that does not make negligible. They can still destroy American cities, and kill millions of Americans, and it would be a desperate gamble to try to destroy them with a disarming first strike. That means we have to pay a lot of attention to the question of China’s resolve. China of course faces huge risks from America’s much greater forces, but its strategists may well calculate that on balance the nuclear factor favors China, because it plays to what they may see as China’s decisive advantage over the US in an East China Sea scenario: the balance of resolve. Let me explain. When two adversaries are relatively evenly balanced in their ability to hurt one another, the advantages lies with the one with greater resolve. More precisely, in the contest of wills that drives any escalating conflict, the advantage lies with the side that can persuade its opponent that it has the greater resolve, and will thus not step back and accept defeat before the escalating conflict has cost the other side more than it is willing to pay. If one side is confident that the other believes it has more resolve, that side will be confident that the other will back off first, and will thus be more willing to enter a conflict, and more willing to escalate it. If the operational balance is as I have suggested here, then this is the situation Washington would face in a conflict with China in support of Japan over the Senkakus. The outcome would depend on the balance of resolve. It would only be wise for America to enter a conflict with China if Washington was confident both that Beijing was less resolved to win than they were, and that Beijing understood this. Only then could Washington be confident that Beijing would accept defeat before the conflict had escalated right out of control, and cost America more than the objectives at stake were worth. So which side has the greater resolve? Is America more committed to preserving the primacy it has enjoyed in Asia for over a century than China is to restore the primacy it enjoyed for centuries before that? I think the answer is probably no. We cannot assume that China is any less determined to change the Asian order than America is to preserve it. Nor can we simply assume that China’s leaders would be too nervous about domestic stability in China to allow a conflict with the US to escalate. On the contrary, public option might well stop Beijing from retreating just as much as US opinion would stop Washington – and probably more so. Ultimately it is a simple question of geography. What happens in Asia, and the waters around Asia, really matters to China, just the way what happens in the Caribbean really matters to America. If we assume that America cares more about the Caribbean than China, we should equally accept that China cares more about the Western Pacific that America. And most importantly, this is probably the way China sees the balance of resolve. That makes China a very dangerous adversary.